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I. INTRODUCTION
The limits of contemporary antidiscrimination law are exceedingly
narrow. There is a wide gulf between conduct that may be popularly
regarded as racist or sexist and that which is prohibited by law, regardless
of whether we focus on constitutional mandates or on the somewhat
broader reach of important antidiscrimination laws, such as Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 To be sure, there is a nearly comprehensive ban
on the use of explicit classifications by legislative bodies' and on the use of
formal policies by private entities, such as employers, 3 that expressly
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1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
2. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Korematsu. the Japanese exclusion
case, was the last time the Supreme Court upheld a race-specific statute disadvantaging a racial
minority under the strict scrutiny/compelling state interest standard used to judge the constitutionality of
racial classifications. The Court's somewhat more lenient stance toward gender classifications through
use of its intermediate scrutiny test has also resulted in the invalidation of most gender-specific laws.
except for the few that the Court regards as implicating real (i.e., biologically based) differences
between the sexes. See Ann E. Freedman, Sex EqualiV; Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92
YALE L.J. 913 (1983).
3. Under Title VII, for example, all racially based policies are specifically prohibited. with a
narrow exception for carefully crafted affirmative-action programs. See United Steel'vorkers v. Weber.
443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). Although not absolutely prohibited, explicit sex-based policies are invalid
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provide for different standards for minorities, women, or other traditionally
disfavored groups. Aside from this insistence on formal or facial equality,
however, the protection of the law is thin.
The legal construct used most consistently to address discrimination is
"intentional disparate treatment." Although specific legislation or judicial
interpretations of particular governing standards at times seem to embody
different principles,4 the ban against intentional disparate treatment goes a
long way toward explaining the law's basic approach to claims of bias. In
its simplest formulation, the ban against disparate treatment requires that
different social groups (whether men and women, minority group members
and whites, or other pairings of traditionally favored and disfavored
groups) be subject to the same rules and standards, at least in circumstances
in which the individuals or groups can be said to be similarly situated. 5
Most often courts also insist that there be an additional showing that the
disparate or different treatment is the product of deliberate or conscious
decisionmaking, to satisfy the requirement that the discrimination was
"intentional." Most notably, in constitutional adjudication since
Washington v. Davis,6 the Court has been strict in demanding proof of
under Title VII unless the employer proves that the policy is a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ exception). See Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991). On
rare occasions, employers have been successful in establishing a BFOQ. See, e.g., Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (excluding women from positions as prison guards in maximum
security facility); Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 1996) (requiring
assignment of both male and female counselors for disturbed adolescents); Chambers v. Omaha Girls
Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 705 (8th Cir. 1987) (discharge of unmarried pregnant teacher who served as
"role model" for teenage girls). See also KATHARINE T. BARTLETr & ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER
AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 224-30 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing BFOQ cases).
4. For example, many scholars have argued that principles of antisubordination, rather than
difference-style equality principles, ought to guide (or at least supplement) constitutional and statutory
interpretation. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: Ot Sex
Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32, 40 (1987); Kathryn
Abrams, The New Jurispndence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998); Ruth
Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003
(1986); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976). Cf
Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994) (defending a view of equality
that opposes the creation or maintenance of social castes). For a discussion of these more "result-
based" theories, see ANDREW KOPPLEMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW & SOCIAL EQUALITY 57-99
(1996).
5. The classic definition of disparate treatment is found in the Title VII case International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977):
"Disparate treatment".... is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer
simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, or
national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations
be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.
Id. at 335 n. 15.
6. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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discriminatory intent, cutting off many potential claims in which unequal
treatment stems from indifference, neglect, or structural inequities.7
In Title VII disparate treatment cases, the meaning of "intentional
discrimination" is more contested. There is currently a debate as to
whether "unconscious disparate treatment" is actionable under the statutes
in cases in which the plaintiff proves that race, sex, or some other
prohibited factor caused the unequal treatment, even if the decisionmaker
did not desire or was not fully aware of the impact of his or her conduct.
By a slim majority, however, the Supreme Court's pronouncement in St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks indicates that plaintiffs cannot be confident
of winning individual disparate treatment cases unless they can marshal
convincing "state of mind" proof of group-based animus or hostility in
addition to race-based disparate treatment.9
Admittedly, there are pockets of legal protection against
stereotyping10 and some legal recognition of disparate impact, a theory of
7. See generally Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1977) (exploring implications of intent requirement
in equal protection litigation).
8. Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. LJ. 1129, 1131 (1999): Michael Salmi.
Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. LJ. 1233 (1999) (response to Professor
Wax). See also Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences.
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L REv. 149, 179-83 (1992); Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title
VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjectihe Decisionmaking. 104 YALE LJ. 2009 (1995); Ann C.
McGinley, iViva La Evoluci6n! Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORN. J.. & PUB.
POL'Y 415 (2000); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L RE-. 899,
900-15 (1993); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Bron. 56 U. CI. L REV.
935 (1989).
9. 509 U.S. 502, 520 (1993). For commentary on Hicks, see Deborah Malamud, The Last
Minuet. Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L REv. 2229 (1995), and Deborah A. Calloway,
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic Assumption, 26 Co.r4. L REv. 997 (1994).
One possible exception to the requirement of proof of intent in disparate treatment cases may be found
in the Supreme Court's analysis of sexual harassment claims. Recently the Court stated that "(s]exual
harassment under Title VII presupposes intentional conduct" signaling that there need be no further
showing of group-based hostility or animus in this category of cases. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth.
524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998). Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the torrent of scholarship surrounding the
Court's decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services. Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). it is still far from
clear whether the courts will insist that plaintiffs present hostile "state of mind" cvidence. at least in
same-sex sexual harassment cases. Se4 eg., Rebecca Hanner White, There's Nothing Special About
Sex: The Supreme Court Mainstreams Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725 (1999)
(engrafting Hicks requirement of proof of intent onto sexual harassment claims).
10. Social psychologists use the term "stereotyping" broadly to describe the "most cognitive
component' of category-based reactions to "people from groups perceived to differ significantly from
one's own." Susan T. Fiske, Stereoiyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 357 (Daniel Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). They distinguish stereotyping
from "prejudice," the most affective component of bias, and "discrimination:' the most behavioral
component of bias. Id.
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liability that reaches unintentional discrimination when facially neutral
policies have adverse effects on a disfavored social group." But each of
these comers of the law is narrowly circumscribed. Compared to the
prohibition against disparate treatment, the legal constraints against
stereotyping and disparate impact are less-uniformly imposed and there is a
great deal of confusion as to the prerequisites for invoking these broader
protections. 12
In constitutional jurisprudence, the distaste for stereotyping tends
principally to supplement the mandate against explicit disparate treatment.
The Court's most forceful condemnations of gender stereotyping and
habitual ways of thinking about women, for example, are found in explicit
classification cases, where the Court's main objective was to undercut the
rationality of formal legislative schemes and to provide support for striking
down explicit gender lines.13 Rarely is a facially neutral rule or a standard
that applies equally to men and women struck down as discriminatory
because it finds its justification in gender stereotypes. 14 The current legal
11. In Teamsters, the Court distinguished disparate impact cases from claims of disparate
treatment. Disparate impact claims "involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be
justified by business necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive ... is not required under a disparate-
impact theory." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15 (internal cross-reference omitted). The classic
disparate impact case is Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), holding that an employer
could not lawfully require entry-level laborers to possess a high school diploma and score above the
median on a general aptitude test. The qualifications were invalidated because they screened out it
disproportionate number of African Americans and were not related to the specific tasks of the job. Id.
at 431-33.
12. For commentary on the difficulties determining the proper scope and application of disparate
impact theory, see Paulette M. Caldwell, Reaffirming the Disproportionate Effects Standard of Liability
in Title VII Litigation, 46 U. Prrr. L. REV. 555 (1985); Paul N. Cox, Substance and Process in
Employment Discrimination Law: One View of the Swamp, 18 VAL. U. L. REV. 21, 45-118 (1983);
Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, Deconstructing Disparate Impact: A View of the Model
Through New Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REV. 325 (1996). For commentary on stereotyping, see Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and
the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471 (1990); Nadine Taub, Keeping
Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REV.
345 (1980); Heather K. Gerken, Note, Understanding Mixed Motives Claims Under the Civil Rights Act
of 1991: An Analysis of Intentional Discrimination Claims Based on Sex-Stereotyped Interview
Questions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1824 (1993).
13. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
14. See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). In Feeney, the Court rejected a
challenge to a sweeping veterans' preference in Massachusetts civil service jobs that virtually locked
out women from upper-level positions. Id. Because the preference was given equally to male and
female veterans, it was treated differently by the Court than an explicit sex-based classification. See id.
at 273-74. Significantly, the Court found no discriminatory purpose underlying the preference,
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disapproval of gender stereotyping is insufficient, for example, to challenge
the use of policies based on implicit male norms without some further
showing of hostility or animus against women 1 5
Even under Title VII, where the Court has provided its most extensive
critique of gender stereotyping in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,16 the
doctrine that has emerged treats evidence of stereotyping primarily as a
method of proving discriminatory intent in a narrow class of mixed-
motivation cases.17 It is far from clear that Title VII requires employers to
take active steps to decrease the likelihood that employment decisions are
influenced by stereotypes about a group, particularly when decisionmakers
do not consciously rely on such damaging generalizations.18
Most importantly, in the last decade, the promise and power of
disparate impact theory has been seriously undermined. The courts have
been reluctant to extend disparate impact too far beyond its "home" in Title
VII. They have ruled that this theory of liability is not available under the
Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes (42 U.S.C. § 198119 and 42 U.S.C.
concluding that the preference was passed to reward veterans, not to hurt women. See id. at 274-75.
The fact that women had historically been excluded from military service by caps on the number of
female volunteers and that Massachusetts did not apply the preference to traditionally female jobs %-.as
insufficient to persuade the Court that the law was motivated at least in part by sex discrimination or
sexual stereotypes. See id. at 283-84 & n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the gender-
based assumptions behind veterans' preference laws in America. see LINDA K. KEnnrt NO
CONSITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADiES 260 (1998) (arguing that the Massachusetts veterans'
preference was influenced by "deep-rooted assumptions that were central to the old law of domestic
relations: that women are covered by husbands' civic identity, that they experience state power through
their fathers' and husbands' service").
15. For example, California's exclusion of pregnancy from the state's disability insurance
program was held constitutional in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). prompting numerous
commentators to criticize the Court's tacit acceptance of men's reproductive processes as normal or
standard while treating pregnancy as "unique." d at 497 n.20. Citing over two dozen articles critical
of Geduldig's result and reasoning, Sylvia Law concluded that denunciation of the decision had become
a "cottage industry." Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution. 132 U. PA. L RE'. 955. 983
(1984).
16. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
17. Most recent lower court cases have narrowed the application of the more plaintiff-oriented
"mixed motivation" framework to instances in which plaintiffs have sufficient direct evidence that sex,
race, or some other prohibited factor played a role in the decision. See, e.g., Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47
F.3d 589,597 n.9 (3d Cir. 1995) (en bane); Randle v. La Salle Telecomms.. Inc., 876 F.2d 563 (7th Cir.
1989). There is, however, considerable debate as to what qualifies as "direct" evidence. See MICVLAI.
J. ZmIsmR, CHARLES A. SuLLIvAN, RICHARD F. RICHARDS & DEBORAH A. CALLOwAY, CAsEs Atz
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 179-8- 204-06 (5th ed. 2000) (collecting and
discussing "direct evidence" cases).
18. See Martha Chamallas, Listenig to Dr. Fiske: The Easy Case of Price Vaterhouse v.
Hopkins, 15 VT. L. REV. 89 (1990); Krieger, supra note 12.
19. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
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§ 198320) and probably may not be invoked to prove age discrimination
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 21 Were it not
for the congressional decisions to write disparate impact theory into the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),22 the Voting Rights Act,23 the
1991 amendments to Title VII, 4 and the fair housing and lending laws,25
this effects-based standard might have quietly disappeared from anti-
discrimination law. Even with respect to Title VII, disparate impact cases
are discouraged by the stringent burden that courts now tend to impose on
plaintiffs to provide refined statistical proof of group adverse impact as part
of the prima facie case.2 6  For example, an empirical study by Professor
John Donahue found that disparate impact cases accounted for less than
two percent of the federal employment discrimination caseload in 1989.27
Although courts still frequently state that the law is designed to
capture subtle as well as overt forms of discrimination, 28 a common
complaint among feminist and critical race commentators is that current
legal doctrines are inadequate to handle contemporary manifestations of
bias against women, racial minorities, and other disfavored social groups.
Two themes are often sounded in the critical commentaries: 1) new-style
discrimination is pervasive yet subtle and hard to distinguish from
20. Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994). The Supreme Court has expressly reserved the issue. See
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). Since Biggins, two appellate courts have
concluded that disparate impact is inapplicable to ADEA cases. See Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73
F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1994).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b)(3), (6) (1994).
23. 42 U.S.C.§ 1973 (a), (b) (1994).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (1994).
25. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994) (Fair Housing Act of 1968); 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994)
(Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974). For a discussion of the confused state of disparate impact
litigation under these two statutes, see Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal
Reconstruction, Fair Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J.
409 (1998).
26. See Flagg, supra note 8, at 2025-30 (discussing technical barriers to establishing successful
disparate impact claim); Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social Science
Theories Identify Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Betveen "Different" Minorities, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 313 (2000) (discussing "small numbers problem" in proving disparate impact and disparate
treatment claims).
27. John J. Donahue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 989 (1991).
28. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) ("Title VII tolerates
no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise"); Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074,
1082 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[Rlegardless of the form that discrimination takes ... the law's prohibition
remains unchanged."); Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 1975) ("Title VII
condemns subtle as well as gross discrimination[.]").
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"normal" ways of doing business and interacting socially,29 and 2) despite
several decades of enforcement of antidiscrimination laws, entrenched
forms of bias are not just being phased out, but are simultaneously being
reproduced in updated forms.
30
In this Article, I will not directly address the important point that
antidiscrimination law is inadequate because it targets mainly intentional
discrimination, missing the more prevalent contemporary forms of bias that
are often nondeliberate or unconscious. 31  Rather, my interest here is in
exploring different forms of bias, beyond disparate treatment and disparate
impact, that have not adequately been theorized in the law. Clearly, insofar
as the law requires that there be "state of mind" evidence showing hostility
or animus before there can be a finding of intentional discrimination, there
is a significant legal impediment to addressing the new forms of bias I
discuss herein, which are not the product of such deliberate discrimination.
However, I do not believe that my discussion is wholly impractical,
precisely because the meaning of intent has always been contested,
particularly in Title VII cases. Sometimes plaintiffs prevail even though
there is no hostility or animus. In some disparate treatment cases, it is
enough to show that race or gender "caused" the employer to treat the
29. Some writers, for example, have explored how racial and gender privilege (the flip side of
racial and gender discrimination) allow dominant groups to receive social advantages in everyday
interactions without perceiving them as special benefits. See MARTHiAt CHAMALLAs. LN-'rRODLcno. TO
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 107-12 (1999) (analyzing literature on white privilege). See also BARBARA
J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT Now I SEE: WHTE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS & THE LAw 144-48 (19981;
PEGGY MCINTOSH, WHITE PRIVILEGE AND MALE PRIVILEGE: A PERSONAt. ACCOUNT rOF COMING TO
SEE CORRESPONDENCES THROUGH WORK IN WOMEN'S STUDIES (Wellesley Coll. Citr. for Research on
Women, Working Paper No. 189, 1988); Jerome McCristal Culp. Jr., To the Bone: Race and White
Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1637 (1999); Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman. Obscuring the
Importance of Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Srism (or Other
Isms), in STEPHAIE M. WLDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERM.ILES
AMIUCA 85, 87 (1996); Deseriee A. Kennedy, Consumer Discrimination: The Limitations of Federal
Civil Rights Protection, 66 Mo. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2001) (manuscript at 43-47, on file w-ith
the Southern California Lt, Review); Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women. In Practice and
Theory:A Reply to Catharine MacKinnon, 5 YALE J.L & FEMINISM 217.235 (1993).
30. E.g., DERRICK BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS: PSAIMS OF SURVIVAL IN AN ALIEN LAND CALLED
HOmE 54 (1996); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wfe Beating as Prerogative and Privacy. 105
YALE LJ. 2117 (1996).
31. See Charles R. Lawrence Ill, 77Te Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). One genre of unconscious racism. knowvn as
"aversive racism" causes a person who professes not to embrace racist beliefs to act in a way that "ties
to ignore the existence of black people, tries to avoid contact with them, and at most to be polite, correct
and cold in whatever dealings are necessary between the races." JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A
PSYCHOHISTORY 54 (1970). Such aversive racism is said to be far more common in contemporary
society than overt racism in which a person deliberately tries to put down blacks or openly proclaims a
belief in white supremacy. See KOPPLEMAN, supra note 4, at 26.
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plaintiff differently, even if the employer was not aware of the operation of
the race or gender factor.32 Such unconscious disparate treatment often
takes the form of cognitive bias, where stereotypes about the group infect
how decisionmakers perceive and interpret events, remember facts, and
later make judgments.33 Such action can plausibly be labeled "intentional,"
because in such cases the decisionmaker acts deliberately rather than
accidentally and the decisionmaking process is infected by race or gender
bias. Thus, even nominally within an intentional discrimination
framework, there may be a shift in emphasis from state of mind to
causation. 34 The larger issue here is whether antidiscrimination law should
focus on what social psychologists call the affective component of bias
(prejudice or hostility) or the cognitive component of bias (stereotyping,
devaluation, and the use of biased prototypes).35 Mapping the contours of
new forms of cognitive bias thus might contribute something useful to the
debate over the meaning of intentional discrimination.
Recently, I reviewed a large sample of the "applied" feminist legal
scholarship addressing persistent substantive inequalities in the major
spheres of women's lives relating to money, sex, family, and
reproduction.36 What struck me most about this diverse body of work was
that it often centered on gender-linked injuries where there was no precise
male analogue and tended to explore the effects of sexism on (largely)
32. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court
Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 288-94 (1997).
33. See Krieger, supra note 12, at 1199-211.
34. Linda Krieger has proposed that such a shift in emphasis from intent to causation be made in
Tide VII disparate treatment litigation:
To establish liability for disparate treatment discrimination, a Title VII plaintiff would simply
be required to prove that his group status played a role in causing the employer's action or
decision. Causation would no longer be equated with intentionality. The critical inquiry
would be whether the applicant or employee's group status "made a difference" in the
employer's action, not whether the decisionmaker intended that it make a difference.
Id. at 1242. See also Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 57-62 (advocating application of tort-like causation
requirements to govern equal protection challenges).
35. See supra note 10. It should be noted, however, that the line between rationality and
emotion, between cognitive processes and affect, is a lively subject of investigation in fields such as
neurology and social psychology. Researchers now believe that "certain aspects of the process of
emotion and feeling are indispensable for rationality." ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR:
EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN xiii (1994). See also Melissa L. Finucane, Ali Alhakami,
Paul Slovic & Stephen M. Johnson, The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1 (2000) (discussing the guiding role of positive and negative feelings in
decisionmaking). Lawyers and judges, however, often draw a distinction between hostility, animus,
and negative feelings toward a social group (i.e., prejudice) and the largely unconscious processes of
selectively noticing, remembering, and processing information about social groups (i.e., cognitive bias
or unconscious stereotyping).
36. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 29, at 171-306.
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single-sex groups. Not surprisingly, writings on such topics as rape,37
domestic violence,38 sexual harassment,39 household labor,40 occupational
segregation, 41 abortion,42 and welfare reform43 seldom discuss intentional
disparate treatment of women because that particular comparative
framework has little to offer in such contexts. The ban on intentional
disparate treatment, even augmented by some restrictions on gender
stereotyping and pockets of disparate impact liability, is not nearly
expansive enough to respond to the varieties of contemporary gender bias
that have little to do with affording women access to traditionally male
domains. Beyond acknowledging that bias need not be deliberate or
intentional to cause injury and create formidable barriers, it is important to
develop new legal concepts to express contemporary patterns.
The two forms of bias I develop in this Article-devaluation and
biased prototypes-are best described as forms of cognitive bias. Although
I draw upon research in social and cognitive psychology to understand their
operation,' my description of these two forms of bias proceeds largely
from my analysis of cases and legal commentary.
II. DEVALUATION
Unlike disparate treatment, devaluation is not strictly speaking a legal
term. The term, however, is commonly used by lawyers, commentators,
37. See e.g., Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows, Guilty of the Crime of Trust: Nanstranger
Rape, 75 MINN. L. REv. 599 (1991); Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibiliy, 11 LAW & PHIL 127
(1992); Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Conmnent on Beyond Rap?, 93 COLUM. L REV.
1442 (1993).
38. See e.g., Martha R Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991); Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modem Reform and the
Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L. 1331 (1997).
39. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franle, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?. 49 STAN. L REV.
691 (1997); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Semal Harassment, 107 YALE LJ 1633 (1998).
40. Se4 e.g., Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1 (1996); Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theot) of Alimony, 82 GEO. LJ.
2227 (1994).
41. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of
Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV.
L. REv. 1749 (1990).
42. Se e.g., Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Bodly: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L REV. 261 (1992).
43. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare "Reform",
36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 287 (1996); Martha Minow, The Welfare of Single Mothers and Their
Children, 26 CONN. L. REv. 817 (1994).
44. For two particularly useful introductions to topics in the psychological literature relevant to
antidiscrimination law, see SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COcGImoN (2d ed. 1991);
THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 10.
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and social activists to express bias that may or may not be legally
prohibited.45 Sometimes the term is used in a general sense to describe the
cause or motivating force behind the unfair treatment of individuals from a
disfavored social group. One writer, for example, has used the term in a
very broad sense to cover any situation in which the lives or interests of
minorities were "systematically and institutionally given less weight"46
than those of the dominant group, even when the bias took the form of
disparate treatment. In this Article, I restrict the use of the term
"devaluation" to describe situations other than clear-cut cases of disparate
treatment where the direct victim is a member of a disfavored class. So
defined, the examples of devaluation are various, yet they all seem to pose
doctrinal difficulties.
A. DEVALUATION COUPLED WiTH EXPLICIT CLASSIFICATIONS
A good starting point for discussion of the legal treatment of
devaluation is a line of Supreme Court equal protection cases starting in the
mid-1970s that challenged government benefit schemes premised on
traditional assumptions about the social roles of men and women.47 Each
of the statutes at issue in the cases involved a familiar gender stereotype,
namely the presumption that the man is (or should be) the breadwinner in a
family, while the woman performs the domestic roles of homemaker and
45. For example, there is rich literature on the devaluation of feminine qualities and activities
and concepts associated with "the feminine" and the corresponding privileging of "the masculine." See
Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in
the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1995); Lucinda M. Finley, Sex-Blind,
Separate but Equal, or Anti-Subordination? The Uneasy Legacy of Plessy v. Ferguson for Sex and
Gender Discrimination, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1105-06 (1996); Francisco Valdes, Unpacking
Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 171, 209 (1996); Deborah Zalesne, When Men Harass Men: Is It Sexual
Harassment?, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTs. L. REV. 395, 397, 409 (1998). On the devaluation of black
motherhood, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Wotuen of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value of
Black Mothers' Work, 26 CONN. L. REV. 871 (1994) [hereinafter Roberts, Black Mothers' Work]. On
the devaluation of women's sexuality, see CHAMALLAS, supra note 29, at 230-36; Alexandra Wald,
What's Rightfully Ours: Toward a Property Theory of Rape, 30 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBS. 459, 483
(1997).
46. Adeno Addis, Recycling in Hell, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2253, 2255 n.8 (1993). See also
KOPPLEMAN, supra note 4, at 10 (stating that the movement to end discrimination "represents a claim
of enormous moral power: the demand that society recognize the human worth of all its members, that
no person arbitrarily be despised or devalued ') (emphasis added).
47. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
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caretaker of children.48 By the time these cases were decided, the Court
had embraced heightened scrutiny for explicit gender classifications and
made it clear that such classifications would be struck down if they were
supported only by "archaic and overbroad" generalizations about the
appropriate roles of men and women.4 9 In that respect, the cases looked
like easy winners for the challengers: The confining stereotype of women
as naturally domestic and maternal was the primary target of women's
rights litigators such as Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who brought two of the cases
before the Court ° The tricky aspect of the cases, however, was that each
could be viewed as involving discrimination against men, rather than
women, and it was far from clear that heightened scrutiny was appropriate
for such "benign" gender classifications. Nevertheless, the benefit schemes
were struck down in each case as impermissible gender discrimination.
These early cases represent rare instances in which devaluation was
held to violate the law. They are noteworthy because they indicate that, in
some contexts at least, the harm of devaluation has been acknowledged and
classified as actionable bias. In the first such case, Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, a woman died in childbirth, leaving her husband to care for
their infant.51 The woman had worked as a teacher and had been the
principal source of economic support for her family. Her husband,
however, was denied social security survivors' benefits under the
prevailing scheme that restricted such benefits to widows who cared for
children after their husbands' deaths. The doctrinal dilemma faced by the
Court was how to characterize the discrimination at issue in the case.
From the perspective of the social security beneficiaries, the statute
seemed clearly to favor women (i.e., widows) and to discriminate against
men (i.e., widowers). After all, it was men who suffered direct economic
48. See ERWIN C-mERINSKY, CONSTTTIrONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.43, at
609-10 (1997) (discussing the Supreme Court's rejection of the gender stereotype of economically
dependent women and economically independent men). In contrast to the Court's disapproval of the
breadwinner/homemaker model, on occasion the Court has treated mothers and fathers differently in
their role as caretakers of children. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (upholding statute that
conferred citizenship on child born outside the United States if the mother (but not the father) %as a
citizen); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 (1981) (upholding law permitting child to ba adopted
without securing consent of the father, if father had not lived with the mother or registered with the
state); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (upholding law that permitted mothers but not fathers to
sue for wrongful death of an out-of-wedlock child).
49. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498,508 (1975). See also Frontiero v. Richardson. 411 U.S.
677, 688-89 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
50. Ginsburg represented the plaintiffs in Wiesenfeld and Goldfarb. See Deborah L Markoitz,
In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman's Work to Change the Law. 11 VoMEN'S RTS. L REP. 73. 87-89.
91-93 (1989).
51. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 639.
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loss by the denial of government benefits. When the statutory scheme was
viewed from the perspective of the now-deceased workers who had paid
social security taxes, however, it looked more like discrimination against
women workers. The argument was that the labor of similarly situated
employed men and women yielded greater benefits to the man's family
than to the woman's family.
In defense of the statutes, the Government argued that the Court ought
to view the statutes as discriminating against the surviving male
beneficiaries, for the simple reason that social security benefits are
noncontractural in nature and not tied directly and exclusively to worker
contributions. 2 Since the deceased woman had no right to the survivor
benefits while she was living (nor did her estate receive the benefits after
death), the Government argued that it was proper to view this explicit
disparate treatment as targeted against men (the traditionally favored
group) to the benefit of the traditionally disfavored class of women.
In rejecting the Government's argument, the Court instead chose to
highlight the injury done to working women, an injury I consider to be a
form of devaluation. For Justice Brennan, the empirical fact that women
were more often financially dependent on their husbands could not "suffice
to justify the denigration of the efforts of women who do work and whose
earnings contribute significantly to their families' support." '53 For the
majority, the principal evil of the statutory scheme was that the work of
women was treated as less valuable than the work of men. The majority
regarded the discrimination as directed at employed women and its
decision insured that this nontraditional group of women was not
disadvantaged vis-h-vis male employees. The focus on employed women
permitted the Court to avoid deciding whether a gender classification that
disadvantaged men who took on "maternal" roles would in itself be
unconstitutional,54 absent the attendant devaluation of women's labor.
In the next few years, the Court invalidated two similar gender
classifications in which the "direct" harm of a benefits scheme fell on
surviving male beneficiaries. Califano v. Goldfarb closely resembled
52. See id. at 646-47.
53. Id. at 645 (emphasis added).
54. The contemporary Court now appears to apply the same intermediate level of scrutiny
whether the classification disadvantages men or women. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511
U.S. 127 (1994) (using peremptory strikes to exclude men from the jury in paternity case held
unconstitutional); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (exclusion of male student
from all-female nursing program held unconstitutional). However, the Court still tolerates some
difference of treatment between nonmarital mothers and fathers in cases involving adoption and other
rights relating to children. See cases cited supra note 48.
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Wiesenfeld, involving the denial of social security benefits to a surviving
husband who could not prove that he had been dependent on his deceased
wife's earnings.55 A presumption of dependency was accorded to all
surviving wives, an application of the gendered breadwinner/homemaker
presumption that had been built into the social security law over the years.
In Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., the Court struck down a
state worker-compensation scheme that extended death benefits to all
widows but required widowers to prove that they were either dependent or
mentally or physically incapacitated. 56 The majority of the Court in each
case focused on the unfairness of the scheme to working women. Because
the women suffered no tangible economic injury while they were alive, the
harm was described somewhat differently than simple disparate treatment,
in which a woman receives less money for her services than a similarly
situated man. Justice Brennan spoke of denying an employed woman "the
dignity of knowing [during her working career] that her social security tax
would contribute to... her husband's welfare should she predecease
him"' 57 and discriminating against "one particular category of family-that
in which the female spouse is a wage earner covered by social security."5 s
Not all members of the Court were willing to view the case from the
perspective of the deceased woman worker. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist
called the approach "a questionable tool of analysis which can be used to
prove virtually anything." 59
The "presumption of dependency" cases lie at the intersection of
disparate treatment and devaluation. From the perspective of the majority,
the most troublesome aspect of the statutory scheme was the devaluation of
women's labor: the simple fact that the worker was a female meant that her
efforts were worth less than a similarly situated male. Even though the
devaluation fully materialized only after the woman's death, the Court
could see how the scheme nevertheless placed women at a disadvantage
compared to men in the workplace. Perhaps because the Court was
particularly interested in supporting women's equality in the public sphere
in those early years of gender discrimination litigation,60 it was prepared to
treat this type of devaluation as a violation of equal protection.
55. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
56. 446 U.S. 142, 147, 152-53 (1980).
57. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 204,208 n.5.
58. Id. at 209. See also Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (holding Aid to Families vith
Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits based on father's (but not mother's) unemplo)n=nt was
unconstitutional).
59. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 239 (Rehnquist, ., dissenting).
60. See CHAmIAAs, supra note 29, at 32-39.
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Compared to other types of devaluation, however, the "presumption of
dependency" cases possess a particular structure that makes them easier to
fit into the traditional equal protection framework. First, each of the
benefit schemes at issue employed explicit gender classifications, i.e., male
beneficiaries were explicitly afforded less-favorable treatment than were
female beneficiaries. Even though this explicit disparate treatment of men
was not regarded by the Court as the principal harm of the statute, it could
nevertheless serve to distinguish this line of cases from others that might
subsequently come before the Court. These cases can be viewed as
devaluation coupled with explicit disparate treatment, or devaluation that
results in explicit disparate treatment. Particularly because the
"presumption of dependency" had earlier been used in benefit schemes that
directly disadvantaged living women workers-most notably the gender-
based denial of fringe benefits in Frontiero v. Richardson 61-it was not a
big step for the Court to invalidate explicitly gender-based programs that
directly disadvantaged men.
Equally as important as the existence of explicit classifications was
the fact that the category that was devalued in each instance-work done
by women covered by social security or workers' compensation-consisted
of a class in which every category member was a woman. The indirect
harm of devaluing women's labor affected a group that was exclusively
female. This kind of devaluation, although to some extent intangible,
nevertheless looked very much like disparate treatment of women as a
group.
B. COVERT RACE-BASED DEVALUATION OF RACIAL MINORITIES
Perhaps the most well known case in which the Court rejected a claim
of devaluation is McCleskey v. Kemp, a race discrimination challenge to
Georgia's death penalty.62 McCleskey's challenge was based on a large-
scale empirical study done by Professor David Baldus for the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund.63 Reviewing over 2,000 murder cases that occurred
in Georgia in the 1970s, the study showed that defendants charged with
killing white victims were 4.3 times more likely to receive a death sentence
than defendants charged with killing black victims.64 The case presented
61. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
62. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
63. See id. at 286. The study is discussed in DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH &
CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS (1990).
64. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287; BALDUS ET AL., supra note 63, at 316.
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for McCleskey was compelling: The researchers used a sophisticated
multiple regression analysis that controlled for 230 nonracial variables that
might have explained the racial disparity. Significantly, using the same
model, the study found that the race of the defendant was a far less
important factor than the race of the victim: Black defendants were only 1. 1
times as likely to receive a death sentence as were other defendants. 65
The Baldus study dramatically illustrated the operation of devaluation
in the context of the criminal justice system. The pernicious pattern that
emerged from the statistics was that a higher value was placed on the lives
of white people than on the lives of black people, as demonstrated by the
fact that the taking of a white life was far more likely to merit stiffer
punishment. This devaluation based on the "race of the victim" factor was
one step removed from ordinary disparate treatment. In an ordinary
disparate treatment case, a black defendant claims that he has received a
harsher penalty than a similarly situated white defendant received.
McCleskey's main argument, however, was not that his race had directly
affected his sentence, but that racial bias had likely affected the evaluation
of the seriousness of his crime, with the effect of devaluing black life
relative to white life. It was as if the decisionmakers had created two
separate categories of crime: the killing of whites and the killing of blacks.
In contrast to disparate treatment, the harm associated with this type of
racial devaluation is visited upon persons other than the criminal defendant.
The refusal to impose the harshest penalty for the taking of black lives may
mean that black communities are less safe and that families and friends of
undervalued black victims will suffer emotional pain if they believe that
justice was not served. Most importantly, the devaluation also illustrates a
greater societal toleration for violence inflicted on blacks, a tolerance
which may reinforce a cultural belief in the inferiority of blacks. Professor
Randall Kennedy has described this kind of devaluation as "racially
selective empathy": "the unconscious failure to extend to [blacks] the same
recognition of humanity, and hence the same sympathy and care, given as a
matter of course to [whites]. 66
65. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287; BALDUs Er AL. supra note 63. at 328-29. The combined
factors of the race of the victim and the race of the defendant did, however, correlate with the decision
to seek the death penalty. The raw data indicated that the prosecutor sought the death penalty in 707% of
the cases involving a black defendant and a white victim, 32% of the cases involving a % hite defendant
and a white victim, 15% of the cases involving a black defendant and a black victim, and 19,7 of the
cases involving a white defendant and a black victim. McCleskey. 481 U.S. at 287; BALtuS Er AL.
supra note 63, at 327 tbl.56.
66. Randall L Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme
Court, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1388, 1420 (1988) (quoting Paul Brest. The Supreme Court. 1975 Term-
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Despite the sophistication of the study and the sizeable race disparities
documented, the Court ruled 5-4 against McCleskey, finding no equal
protection violation. Accepting the soundness of the Baldus study for the
sake of argument, the majority held that McCleskey had not proven race
discrimination because he could not prove that racial bias had infected the
decisionmaking in his individual case. By its very design, a large-scale
statistical study such as the one conducted in McCleskey could only
demonstrate "a risk that the factor of race entered into some capital
sentencing decisions and a necessarily lesser risk that race entered into any
particular sentencing decision." 67 Baldus testified that he could not say to a
moral certainty that race had influenced the process in McCleskey's case. 68
Given the circumstances in McCleskey's case, the most that could be said
was that there was a substantial risk that he had received the death penalty
because his victim was white. The bias uncovered by the Baldus study was
covert in nature and arose from the abuse of discretion, rather than from the
application of an explicit racial classification. Given that there will
inevitably be some instances in which the exercise of discretion is not
tainted by race, covert discrimination almost never affects every member of
the category. Thus, there was a chance that McCleskey's punishment was
unaffected by the race of the victim, a chance that would not have existed if
the statutory scheme had been explicit and instructed decisionmakers to
take the race of the victim into account in their determinations. To this
extent, the case differed from the "presumption of dependency" cases,
where it was impossible to escape devaluation because the statute explicitly
denied comparable benefits to male survivors and hence automatically
devalued the labor of their deceased wives.
Nevertheless, to my mind, the devaluation exposed in McCleskey is
similar in all important respects to the devaluation in the "presumption of
dependency" cases. In each instance, the primary "victims" are not persons
directly affected by the statutes at issue, but are people whose lives or
activities have been judged to be worth less than members of the more
dominant group in society. The price tag placed on women's labor in the
early cases was determined by the stereotypical judgment that women's
labor was marginal or secondary and need not be "replaced" when the
female worker died. The value placed on black life as revealed by the
Baldus study was affected by the invidious judgment that it was
Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1976)) (alterations
and citations omitted in original).
67. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291 n.7.
68. Id. at 308-09 & n.29.
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permissible to view the death of a white person as an offense more serious
than the death of a black person and to reserve the death penalty for these
more egregious cases.
That the devaluation in McCleskey was not combined with an explicit
racial classification should not be determinative. It is true that the
defendants affected by the devaluation in McCleskey were a mixed racial
group, because both white and black defendants who killed white persons
were more vulnerable to the death penalty. In contrast, in the "presumption
of dependency" cases, the affected group was made up entirely of males.
However, for purposes of determining the legal significance of devaluation,
it should not matter that the reverberating effects of the devaluation fall
most tangibly on members of the favored class only. In fact, one could
argue that the effect of the devaluation in McCleskey is only the more
troublesome because some black defendants will also be harmed. Instead,
if the focus is on the class of persons whose lives are devalued (i.e., the
crime victims and the deceased workers) in both McCleskey and the
"presumption of dependency" cases, it is significant that such group is
composed entirely of persons from a traditionally disfavored group. At
least as far as the Baldus study revealed, the lives of white crime victims
were not devalued (compared to blacks) and thus the category that was
devalued-"black life"--described the race of every category member.
The further distinctive feature of McCleske-that the devaluation
occurred as a result of a covert abuse of discretion rather than an overt
statutory direction-also strikes me as substantively insignificant. There is
no consensus that explicit classifications impose greater or different harms
than covert racial classifications and no legal basis for treating covert
discrimination differently than overt discrimination, at least where there is
proof of discriminatory intent. Like disparate treatment, devaluation can be
accomplished through statutory direction or abuse of discretion. The fact
that the devaluation in McCleskey might not have occurred in every case
may not be as crucial as the Court suggests. Presumably, the Court would
have struck down a scheme that explicitly authorized jurors and other legal
actors to take the race of the victim into account in deciding whether to
impose the death penalty, even if there was no further showing that the race
of the victim had in fact tainted the judgment in the individual case. Thus,
I suspect that it was the formalistic distinction between explicit and covert
classifications, and the fact that this case involved devaluation rather than
disparate treatment, that made the case so difficult for the Court. There is a
strong argument to be made that proof as compelling as the regression
analysis in McCleskey should make us highly suspicious that there is bias
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in the system, without a further showing that the harm occurred in each
individual case. The high risk that devaluative judgments about the lesser
worth of black life affected a large number of cases should have been
enough to make the Court hesitate to authorize the death penalty if it
believed that racial devaluation was an injury on par with disparate
treatment. The Court's unwillingness to invalidate Georgia's sentencing
scheme suggests that it does not yet recognize devaluation as a form of bias
covered by equal protection, at least in the absence of explicit
classifications.
C. COVERT GENDER-BASED DEVALUATION OF AN INTEGRATED GROUP
Although not recognized as a legal injury, probably the most
adequately theorized type of devaluation is found in the theory of
comparable worth. Of the three examples of devaluation I discuss in this
Part, comparable worth also seems to be the most difficult for the courts to
comprehend and to acknowledge as a type of discrimination. Comparable
worth theory was developed to address the problem of the sizable disparity
in earnings between male and female workers. 69 It was an attempt to
respond to the contention that a large portion of the gender wage gap is
traceable to the high degree of gender segregation in jobs70 and cannot be
69. The wage gap has narrowed in recent years, but is still sizeable. In 1999, women's median
annual earnings were 72% of men's, compared to 59% of men's earnings in 1963. See NAT'L COMM.
ON PAY EQUITY, THE WAGE GAP OVER TIME, http:llwww.feminist.comlfairpay/fchange.htm (updated
Oct. 2000). One comprehensive study concluded that the gender gap in earnings has probably narrowed
to the point where women who work a similar number of hours as men earn at least 75% percent of
male earnings and probably somewhat more. See ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. BRIDGES,
LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY 56 (1999). The authors predicted that at current rates, it was
unlikely that the earnings gap would disappear anytime in the next decade or two.
70. The 1990 census showed that the labor market is still characterized by a high degree of sex
segregation. Katherine Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of
Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 87 (1995). Skilled-trades jobs continue to be heavily
dominated by men (e.g., only one in fifty-eight carpenters is a woman; one in twenty welders is a
woman). Id. The professions are more integrated but still are identifiably male (e.g., 79% of physicians
are men; 87% of dentists are men; 76% of lawyers are men). Id. at 88. Most women continue to work
in low-paying, low-mobility, largely segregated jobs. See WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
20 LEADING OCCUPATIONS OF EMPLOYED WOMEN: 1999 ANNUAL AVERAGES, http://www.dol.gov/
dol/wb/public/wb-pubs/20lead99.htm (May 2000) (indicating that eleven of the twenty leading
occupations for women remain over 70% female, with secretarial work-98.6% female-the leading
occupation); DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY 141 (1997)
(reporting that "women still account for only about 16 percent of full professors in law schools, 13
percent of the partners in the nation's 250 largest law firms, and 8 percent of judges in the federal
courts"); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND VHAT TO
Do ABOUT IT 66 (2000) (reporting that three-fourths of all working women work in predominantly
female jobs).
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remedied simply by enforcing the Equal Pay Act's command to pay women
the same as men who perform equal jobs.
From its inception in the early 1980s, the strategy behind comparable
worth focused on devaluation.7' Unlike ordinary disparate treatment
claims, which center on denying women access to traditionally male jobs
(or providing equal pay for equal work), comparable worth claims seek to
revalue traditionally female jobs and improve conditions for both men and
women in these jobs.
Comparable worth theory rests on the proposition that work perceived
as women's work72 has been downgraded and that the value of work
performed in predominantly female jobs-by male and female workers
alike-is systematically underrated, given the relative skill, effort, and
responsibility involved. Comparable worth advocates rely on job
evaluation techniques that measure the worth of the job to an employer,
beyond simply relying on the market wage. 73 Most job evaluations of this
sort require precisely defining the job, specifying the factors that are
relevant to compensation (such as supervisory responsibility and skill), and
assigning points based on the level of each compensatory factor. The
objective of such an evaluation is to construct a hierarchy of jobs within an
organization that reflects the internal value of the jobs. While job
evaluation techniques are to some degree subjective and may themselves
not be free of gender bias,74 they have the virtue of requiring employers to
be consistent in the factors they identify as important in setting the
compensation for both male and female jobs, and they limit the tendency to
exaggerate the significance of differences among jobs. To the degree that
substantial pay disparities continue to exist between predominantly male
71. For a synopsis of comparable worth theory, see NELSON & BRIDGES, supra note 69, at 50.
72. Jobs that are at least 70% female are typically characterized as "women's" jobs. Ruth G.
Blumrosen, IVage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U.
MICH. J.L. REFOP 399,461-62 (1979).
73. E.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality: Pay. Equity Reform and the Politics of
Legal Mobilization, 1988 DUKE LJ. 1207, 1228-29 (examining job evaluation. comparable worth and
workplace segregation); MtCHAEL V. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK 28-31 (1994).
74. Researchers have attempted to reform job evaluation schemes to purge them of inherent male
biases. Their studies investigate the list of job factors used to assure that traits, abilities, and skills
associated with women are not ignored, particularly when traits, abilities, and skills associated with men
are rewarded. Evaluation schemes that give sufficient credit to high-level skills in "care-giving, conflict
resolution, and manual dexterity"-undervalued skills associated with women-are being developed.
See NELSON & BRIDGES, supra note 69, at 340 (citing Ronnie Steinberg & W. Lawrence Walter,
Making Women's Work Visible, The Case of Nursing: First Steps in the Design of a Gender-Neutral
Job Comparison System (1992) (unpublished paper presented at the Third Women's Policy Res-Zarch
Conference, May 15-16, 1992)).
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and predominantly female jobs that are rated comparably, the inference is
that it is the sex-typing of the job that accounts for the disparity.
Comparable worth theory was tested in the 1980s when large-scale
comparable worth studies of public jobs were conducted in several states.
The studies documented the existence of substantial disparities in pay-
most often on the order of twenty percent-between comparably rated
predominantly male and predominantly female jobs.75  Notably, the
empirical research disclosed that the more intensively an occupation was
dominated by women, the greater the disparity in wages for both male and
female workers in that job category.76 These studies serve as "proof" of the
devaluation of women's work, insofar as they are accepted as a measure of
the penalty attributable to the gender coding of jobs.77
The theoretical significance of comparable worth lies in its core
contention that women's work is judged to be less important, and hence
less worthy of compensation, simply because it is mostly women who do
such work. The theory claims that the gender of the majority of job
holders, rather than the intrinsic demands of the work, influences a job's
place in the hierarchy. A kind of vicious cycle operates to perpetuate lower
wages for workers in "female" jobs: not only do jobs in which women have
been traditionally segregated happen to be lower paying jobs, but they are
lower paying, at least in part, because they are jobs that have been reserved
for women.78 This cycle explains the phenomenon of "job shifting"-the
lowering of pay or prestige when a particular job or occupation changes
from being male-dominated to female-dominated. One of the best known
75. NELSON & BRIDGES, supra note 69, at 326 (most job evaluation studies show that
predominantly female jobs are underpaid by about 20%). See also ALICE H. COOK, UNIV. OF HAW. AT
MANOA, COMPARABLE WORTH: THE PROBLEM AND THE STATES' APPROACHES TO WAGE EQUITY
(1983) (surveying approaches to pay disparity in eighteen states). A more recent study projects that if
comparable worth wage adjustments were made in predominantly undervalued female jobs, women's
median level of wage would rise 13.2% and the percentage of female to male wages would rise from
72.2% in 1995 to 81.9%. Deborah M. Figart & June Lapidus, A Gender Analysis of U.S. Labor Market
Policies for the Working Poor, FEMINIST ECON., Fall 1995, at 60, 65 (1995), cited in BARTLETT &
HARRIS, supra note 3, at 306.
76. See COMM. ON OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION & ANALYSIS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE 28-29 n. 13 (Donald J. Treiman
& Heidi I. Hartmann eds., 1981).
77. A four-year study by the Institute for Women's Policy Research of comparable worth
measures implemented in twenty states found that, in the comparable worth states, wage ratios between
female and male workers rose to 74-88%, compared to a national average of 71% in 1992. See Heidi I.
Hartmann & Stephanie Aaronsen, Pay Equity and Women's Wage Increases: Success in the States, a
Model for the Nation, I DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 69, 80 (1994). See also Naresh C. Agarwal, Pay
Equity in Canada: Current Developments, 41 LABOR LJ. 518 (1990) (discussing comparable worth
implementation in Ontario, Canada).
78. Blumrosen, supra note 72, at 455-57.
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examples involves a cross-cultural comparison: Being a physician is a
high-status, high-paying job in the United States where men dominate the
field; in Russia, where women are far more likely to be doctors, the job
carries less prestige and money.7 9 In the United States, this shifting
phenomenon took place over time in the occupations of secretary and bank
teller, which lost prestige when women entered and began to dominate the
field.80 The gender shift from male to female may also take place when
work becomes degraded by routinization or mechanization.8' Or the
devaluation may occur simply when the field becomes integrated, even
when no change at all occurs in the nature of the tasks.82
Sociologists explain the devaluation that occurs in female-dominated
jobs as a kind of stereotyping in which assessments of the importance of
the type of work are fundamentally influenced by the social value of a
typical incumbent in the job. This means that predominantly male jobs still
carry more prestige than predominantly female jobs, regardless of the
specific content of the work.83 In this account, devaluation operates at the
cognitive level, influencing and shaping categories. The work itself
becomes gendered, even though there may be nothing in the tasks of a
particular job that make it more suitable for either men or women. As one
sociologist described the theoretical model supporting comparable worth:
"This is not an argument about discrimination against individuals but
against jobs. The argument is that jobs and organizational structure may be
fundamentally influenced by gender."84
Comparable worth theory thus challenges the cognitive association
between women's work and work of low value. Like the race-linked
devaluation uncovered by the Baldus study, the injury targeted by
79. CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE DIsINcnoNs: SEX. GENDER. AND THE SOCL
ORDER 152 (1988).
80. BARBARA F. RESKIN & PATRICIA A. Roos, JOB QUEUES. GENDER QUELUES: -XLAIN;G
WOMEN'S INROADS INTO MALE OCCUPATIONS 11-15 (1990).
81. CATHARmNE A. Mv[ACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSME.NT OF VORKING WO.,EN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRMIINATION 12 (1979) (noting that automation sometimes converts skilled -male" jobs into
unskilled "female" jobs).
82. See, e.g., Patricia A. Roos & Katharine W. Jones, Shifting Gender Bomndaries: Women's
Inroads into Academic Sociology, in GENDER INEQUALITY AT WORK 297. 303-14 (Jerry A. Jacobs ed..
1995) (noting that women's representation in the field rose markedly when federal funding for rzearch
declined, real earnings decreased, and unemployment rose).
83. See, e.g., PAULA ENGLAND, COMPARABLE VORTH: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 104-05
(1992); Ronnie J. Steinberg, Gender on the Agenda: Male Advantage in Organizations. 21 CO ELmP.
Soc. 576 (1992) (book review).
84. Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Sex Composition and Gendered Earnings lnequality: A
Comparison of Job and Occupational Afodels, in GENDER INEQUALITYAT WOMK supra note 82. at 23.
29.
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comparable worth theory is collective in nature, affecting a group of
employees (male and female) who work in undervalued jobs and
occupations. The undervaluation is not traceable to the sex of the
individual job holder, but rather to the sex of the prototypical job holder.
Despite the development of comparable worth theory outside the law,
the courts have rejected comparable worth as a theory of liability. In the
mid-1980s, a few influential decisions in the lower courts85 had the effect
of halting the filing of comparable worth claims86 and shifting the
movement toward implementing comparable worth through legislative
action and collective bargaining. 7 The judicial objections to comparable
worth were various, ranging from an asserted lack of judicial competence
to handle such wide-ranging claims of disparate pay88 to an unwillingness
to view an employer's reliance on the market rate for a job as a "policy"
subject to scrutiny under the federal antidiscrimination laws.89 At the
doctrinal level, the courts insisted that plaintiffs come up with proof of
discriminatory animus beyond statistical studies showing that the employer
set pay for predominantly female jobs at rates lower than comparable male
jobs. The final blow to comparable worth as a legal theory of
discrimination was dealt in American Federation of State, County, &
Municipal Employees v. Washington9" when the Ninth Circuit held that
plaintiffs had not established a prima facie case of wage discrimination
under Title VII even though the employer's own job evaluation study
indicated that women's wages were devalued.
One contemporary context that is particularly ripe for a revival of a
comparable-worth-type challenge involves the sizeable pay disparities
between coaches of men's and women's sports teams, particularly at the
collegiate level. Coaches of women's teams typically receive far lower
85. The two most important cases were Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686
(9th Cir. 1984), and American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees v. Washington, 770
F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). See also Am. Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986).
86. One study describes the case law development as the "rise and fall of pay equity as a theory
of discrimination." NELSON & BRIDGES, supra note 69, at 352. The study concludes that plaintiffs
were defeated in these cases because the courts were willing to invoke the market as an explanation of
male/female wage differentials despite only weak evidence in the record to support such an explanation.
Id. at 356.
87. By 1987, twenty states had made some comparable worth adjustments for state employees,
but had not extended comparable worth to private employers. See SARAH M. EVANS & BARBARA J.
NELSON, WAGE JUSTICE: COMPARABLE WORTH AND THE PARADOX OF TECHNOCRATIC REFORM 71-72
(1989). For an analysis of specific case histories, see MCCANN, supra note 73, at 68-77.
88. See Am. Nurses'Ass'n, 783 F.2d at 720.
89. See Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 708-09.
90. 770 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1985).
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salaries and benefits than coaches of the men's teams, even in the same
sport.91 The lower salaries of the coaches of the women's teams are part of
the larger, gendered structure of intercollegiate athletic programs and
reflect the lower status generally of the women's teams. In addition to
coaches' salaries, colleges and universities devote greater resources to
men's athletics programs than to women's programs in terms of overall
budget, athletic scholarships, recruiting dollars and money spent on
equipment, and publicity and training.92 The lower status of women's
sports is then used by universities to justify the pay disparity. When the
disparities are questioned, the schools often claim that coaching men's
sports is a different (and arguably more difficult) job than coaching the
corresponding women's team.93 So far this argument has served to defeat
potential Equal Pay Act claims, which require that the targeted disparity
occur in jobs that are substantially equal and not traceable to factors other
than sex, such as the number of persons supervised and the size of the
program.94 Moreover, the chances for a successful Title VH challenge on
behalf of the coaches of the women's teams are slim due to the simple fact
that men as well as women may coach women's teams and are increasingly
likely to do so. 95 The reality, however, is that few women are selected to
coach men's teams and thus rarely are able to escape the devaluation of
women's sports.96 As Professor Deborah Brake has argued in a recent
article on the theoretical underpinnings of Title IX (the federal law
prohibiting sex discrimination in educational programs),97 the pay disparity
contributes to the continuing devaluation of women's teams and quite
91. Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the 77reory Behind Title IX. U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 138-40, on file with the Souahem California
Law Review).
92. Id. at 128-32. See also B. Glenn George, Miles to Go and Promises to Keep: A Case Study
in Title IX, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 555,557 (1993).
93. See, e.g., Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1321 (9th Cir. 1994) (coaching men's and
women's basketball dissimilar based on difference in public relations and promotional activities); Dali
v. Univ. of Minn., 865 F. Supp. 958, 961 (D. Minn. 1994) (coaching men's and women's sports
dissimilar due to differences in spectator attendance, revenue generation, and media relations).
94. See, e.g., EEOC v. Madison Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 577, 581,584 (7th Cir.
1987); Bartges v. Univ. of N.C. at Charlotte, 908 F. Supp. 1312, 1328 (W.D.N.C. 1995). For a
discussion of the Equal Pay Act cases, see Lisa A. Bireline Sarver, Coaching Contracts Take an the
Equal Pay Act: Can (and Should) Female Coaches Tie the Score?. 28 CREIIffTON L REv,. 885. 890-92
(1995).
95. Brake reports that women now hold less than half of the coaching positions for wyomen's
teams. Prior to the passage of Title IX in 1972, women held over 907 of coaching positions on
women's teams. Brake, supra note 91, at 151.
96. Strikingly, the percentage of women among the coaching ranks of collegiate men's athletics
is less than two percent R. VtVlAN ACOSTA & LINDA JEAN CARPENTER, WOMEN IN INTERCOLUEGL'TE
SPORT: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY-TWENTY-THREE YEAR UPDATE 1977-2000, at 5 12000).
97. Brake, supra note 91.
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demonstrably harms female athletes. Neither the harm to the coaches, both
male and female, of women's teams, nor that visited on female athletes,
however, has yet been considered actionable under the prevailing
antidiscrimination laws. The failure to recognize devaluation as a legal
injury makes it harder to address sex bias in all-female settings such as
women's sports.
Aside from the practical difficulties of implementing comparable
worth, a full discussion of which is beyond the scope of this essay,98 at its
core comparable worth theory addresses a kind of devaluation that is not
radically different from that found in the "presumption of dependency"
cases and in McCleskey. The devaluation of women's labor that the Court
ruled unconstitutional in the "presumption of dependency" cases bears an
obvious resemblance to the devaluation of women's jobs sought to be
redressed by comparable worth theory. To be sure, the mechanism of
devaluation in the "presumption of dependency" cases was the sex-based
statutory scheme itself. Thus, it was self evident that it was the sex of the
workers that caused their labor to be worth less to their surviving spouses.
In the comparable worth context, by contrast, it is less obvious and more
contested that it is the sex of the majority of the jobholders that is
producing the depressed pay scale. Whether one is convinced that the
gender coding of the job is a cause of the lower pay ultimately depends, of
course, on the soundness and persuasiveness of the comparable worth
study. My point, however, is that the theory behind comparable worth-
that the stereotyping of a job as "women's work" reduces its material
value-shares much in common with the "presumption of dependency"
cases in which the statutory scheme was premised on the stereotypical
assumption that women's labor was secondary and not essential to the
welfare of the family.
There is also a similarity between the devaluation of black lives
unearthed by the Baldus study in McCleskey and the devaluation of
women's jobs revealed by comparable worth studies. The regression
analysis controlling for important nonracial variables that might justify or
otherwise explain the imposition of the death penalty represents an
elaborate attempt to compare cases that are admittedly nonidentical.
Because no homicide is exactly alike, there will never be the perfect
comparison case in which the only difference is the race of the victim. To
determine whether devaluation is present, when the mechanism of
98. Some of the objections to comparable worth are canvassed in MCCANN, supra note 73, at
31-35 and RHODE, supra note 70, at 171-75.
[Vol. 74:747
LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF BIAS
devaluation is the covert abuse of discretion, requires some reliable
methodology to group and rank large numbers of cases. The use of a
sophisticated statistical method to compare comparable cases is also the
hallmark of a comparable worth study, which attempts to break down
different jobs into factors that can be assigned a given value across jobs.
Resorting to some reasonable method to compare nonidentical but similar
cases is critically important for the development of antidiscrimination law.
Because by definition subordinated groups are not often similarly situated
to the majority, there will likely be no perfect comparator, e.g., no "male"
job that is exactly like a "female" position but valued more highly.
There is at least one significant respect, however, in which the
devaluation complained of by comparable worth advocates differs from the
devaluation at issue in both the "presumption of dependency" cases and in
McCleskey. In the comparable worth context, the category that is devalued
(i.e., women's work) is comprised of both male and female workers, and
thus devaluation operates to diminish the efforts of a sexually integrated
group. In the other two instances of devaluation, the devalued category
was exclusively female or minority, respectively. It is true that even in
these two instances the effects of devaluation as they reverberated
throughout society tangibly affected persons outside the disfavored group,
such as the male beneficiaries who were harmed by the devaluation of their
deceased wives' labor. But in neither case could it be said that the labor or
lives of the dominant group were devalued.
That the devalued category in the case of comparable worth (i.e.,
people who work in women's jobs) also includes members of the favored
group is perhaps what makes this type of devaluation particularly difficult
for the courts to comprehend. As the sociological theory stresses,99 the
stereotyping in this context relates to jobs, not to individual women or even
women as a social group. With respect to predominantly female jobs, it is
the category of "women's work" that is being devalued. With devaluation,
it is not enough simply to ask whether the plaintiff would have been treated
better if she had been a member of the more privileged group. The
gendering of a category, especially when it operates to harm both men and
women, may thus seem far removed from the sex-based disparate treatment
of individuals addressed by the Equal Protection Clause and antidiscrim-
ination statutes.
The remainder of this Part attempts to specify some of the salient
features of devaluation using comparable worth theory as a model. My
99. See supra text accompanying note 84.
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choice of comparable worth as a model for devaluation is purposeful. By
focusing on this more complex and legally controversial form of
devaluation, I hope to tease out the features that may not be as visible in the
two other, "easier" examples of devaluation.
D. GENERAL FEATURES OF DEVALUATION
The first feature of devaluation that may set it apart from ordinary
disparate treatment is that devaluation seems to operate primarily at the
cognitive level. Devaluation affects the way we value activities,
institutions, injuries, and other "things," which, strictly speaking, have no
race or gender. Devaluation does not operate directly at the level of the
individual or even the social group; rather, it operates to affix a "gender" or
"race" to a neutral activity or category and simultaneously to place it on a
hierarchy of value. What is devalued is the entire category at issue,
whether it is women's work,100 housework,1° 1 part-time work,102 emotional
harm,10 3 "feminine" behavior1°4 or black life. 0 5 Even when the members
of the devalued category consist entirely of members of one social group,
like the class of deceased women workers in the "presumption of
dependency" cases, the process of devaluation seems directed less at the
workers themselves than at the work that they perform. This "denigration
of the efforts of women"'1 6 was one step removed from disparate treatment
of women: the direct effects of the devaluation were felt only by the
workers' husbands after their death. In this sense, it was their work that
was devalued, not their persons.
Gender-based devaluation, however, is closely connected to the kind
of gender-based stereotyping of individuals and social groups that often
produces disparate treatment. In devaluation, however, it is the mental or
cognitive association of the activity with a particular gender or racial group
that affects its placement on the hierarchy, for example, making the act of
killing a white person a more serious crime than the act of killing a black
person. Among the examples of devaluation I have examined in this Part
100. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 29, at 184-97; ENGLAND, supra note 83, at 104-05.
101. See sources cited supra note 40.
102. See WILLIAMS, supra note 70, at 72-75 (discussing marginalization of part-time work);
Martha Chamallas, Women and Pan-Time Work: The Case for Pay Equity and Equal Access, 64 N.C.
L. REv. 709, 711 (1986).
103. On the devaluation of emotional harm in tort law, see Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of
Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463,491-500,525-26 (1998).
104. See sources cited supra note 45.
105. See sources cited supra note 66.
106. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975).
[Vol. 74:747
LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF BIAS
and in other articles, °7 the critical move seems to be to match the value of
the category to the social value of the prototypical incumbent. Women's
work is devalued in part because it is mostly women who do such work.
The gendering of a category, activity, or injury is indeed a kind of
stereotyping, in that it focuses our attention selectively on the gender of the
actors, obscuring other features that might lead to a different evaluation.
Thus, we may tend to notice the gender of secretaries and focus less
attention on the conditions under which the job is performed. This process,
however, is distinct from saddling a "nonconforminc," or "nontraditional"
individual With generalizations or stereotypes about her group, which is the
more familiar form of stereotyping most often linked to disparate treatment.
Despite its cognitive nature, however, devaluation often has serious
material effects. The low/high value assigned to the category has an
adverse impact on incumbents and others, giving material effect to the
judgments of value. In McCleskey, for example, the "race of the victim
effect" could make the difference between life and death for criminal
defendants. For women workers, the persistence of lower pay scales for
predominantly female jobs is a highly significant factor in the gender wage
gap that generally makes it more difficult for women than for men to act as
breadwinners for their families. As I see it, devaluation as a theory is
related to disparate impact theory, because each targets ostensibly neutral
policies or categories that produce group adverse impacts and each is
interested in eliminating the mechanisms that reproduce disparities in
wealth and status for traditionally disfavored groups. As it has developed
in Title VII law, however, disparate impact theory has largely been
confined to challenging the choice of qualifications for jobs and other
discrete policies that screen and sort workers. 1 8  In contrast, the
devaluation discussed here has a broader focus: It is designed to pose a
107. Devaluation of interests and injuries associated with women and racial minorities in tort law
is discussed in Chamallas, supra note 103, at 463 (1998); Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of
Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63
FORDHAm L. REV. 73 (1994) [hereinafter Chamallas, Economic Data in Tort Litigationl: Martha
Chamallas with Linda K. Kerber, Wonzen, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History. 88 Mim. L
REV. 814 (1990).
108. There is some question, for example, whether Title VII disparate impact analysis applies to
employment practices other than objective tests and selection devices. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co..
998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (working conditions); Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines. Inc.. 967 F.2d
1161 (7th Cir. 1992) (fringe benefits and compensation policies); EEOC v. Ci. Miniature Lamp
Works, 947 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1991) (passive policies and employer inaction); Beard v. Whitley County
REMC, 840 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1988) (wage and benefits negotiations), Caviale v. Dep't of Health &
Soc. Servs., 744 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1984) (employer's choice of labor pool).
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challenge to structural features, like job hierarchies, and basic categories of
thought that are distorted by cognitive bias.
The third notable feature of devaluation is that it is often selective in
its operation, affecting subgroups or subtypes, rather than all members of a
disfavored group. Not only do some members of the disfavored group
escape the effects of devaluation; they may actually benefit from the
process. Thus, the devaluation in the "presumption of dependency" cases,
while disadvantaging one subgroup of women (i.e., employed women),
produced a relative advantage to another subgroup of women (i.e.,
widows). Even the devaluation of women's work addressed by comparable
worth may work to the advantage of some women in "male" jobs, insofar
as they derive a benefit from the overvaluation of male-dominated jobs.
This selectivity in impacts, of course, is also present in most cases of
disparate treatment. Virtually no gender-based classification encompasses
within its reach all groups of women. Instead, such classifications
ordinarily select out some group of women for special treatment, leaving
other groups of women unaffected and sometimes relatively advantaged. It
may well be that the "double-edged sword" quality of devaluation is simply
more visible. However, it does seem important to underscore that, at times,
devaluation also negatively impacts some members of the favored group if
they find themselves part of the devalued category. Male workers in
predominantly female jobs presumably suffer the same devaluative injury
as female incumbents. Because the gendering (or racing) of a category is
keyed to the prototypical member of the category and not to specific
individuals, it will often be the case that men whose lives follow "female"
patterns will be negatively affected. Although this integrated effect may be
hard to classify as discrimination under existing legal doctrine, I believe it
is a phenomenon that is fairly well understood in ordinary life. The very
fact that we speak of "female jobs" and "black schools" and have little
difficulty locating their place on the hierarchy indicates an appreciation for
the link between, on the one hand, the racial and gender identification of
activities and institutions and, on the other, social value.
The fourth feature of devaluation that marks it as a peculiarly
contemporary form of bias is that devaluation is masked. In most cases, the
bias against a disfavored group that causes or produces the devaluation will
not be apparent or encased within explicit classifications. Nor will
devaluation operate automatically in every potential case, a fact that
sometimes makes it difficult to determine whether the effects of
devaluation are felt in a given instance. Instead, there are likely to be
plausible neutral reasons for the unfavorable treatment of members in the
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devalued class and it will be necessary to examine a large class of cases to
determine whether devaluation is operating within the system. Thus, for
example, in the comparable worth context, because differences in job tasks
and working conditions may well justify a difference in pay rates, those
differences must be ruled out before it can be said that gender coding of the
job is a cause of depressed wages. As discussed above, 10 9 the methodology
used to tease out bias in complicated systems such as the market for jobs or
the criminal justice system will inevitably itself be complex and subject to
debate.
That such bias is hard to uncover and document, however, should not
be surprising given the nature of contemporary attitudes about race and
gender. A recent survey of psychological literature, for example,
characterizes racial attitudes in the United States as changing dramatically
since the 1940s, such that the perceived norm is now one that favors racial
equality. As one psychologist puts it, however, there is a "discrepancy
between words and deeds," 10 documented by experiments that continue to
show that whites are less willing to help blacks in circumstances in which
they would aid whites and more willing to punish (and blame) blacks in
ambiguous situations. The major change in our society may be the change
in perceived norms and the driving of racism underground. In an
environment where racism is generally regarded as unacceptable, "whites
[are] no longer comfortable expressing racism directly [but] express it
instead by advocating traditional values and policy preferences that all
happened to disadvantage black people." '' n Particularly because it operates
at the systemic level, devaluing categories of activities and negatively
affecting some members of the favored group, devaluation performs the
masking function exceedingly well. Limiting the legal definition of
discrimination to intentional disparate treatment virtually insures that the
knowledge about hidden biases and subtle racism now studied most
intensively by contemporary social scientists will not find its way into the
law.
The last feature of devaluation that I extrapolate from my examples is
perhaps the most pertinent to any prospects for recognizing devaluation as
a legal injury. Despite its differences from disparate treatment, at its core
devaluation is nevertheless comparative. Ultimately to decide whether a
category has been devalued we must ask whether it would be assigned the
same value if there were no cognitive association with the disfavored
109. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
110. Fiske, supra note 10, at 359.
111. Id.
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group. The fundamental comparative causation question that drives
disparate treatment ("Would the plaintiff have been treated better if she
were a man?"; "Would the defendant have been sentenced to death if he
were white?") also seems to underlie an analysis of devaluation. The
comparison, however, is at a different level. In devaluation, we are
interested in comparing classes of activities-such as male and female
jobs-or classes of cases-such as homicides involving a single victim
committed in the course of another felony-to see whether race or gender
as a variable has explanatory power. In the last analysis, however, the
default that sets the standard by which devaluation is gauged is the
valuation given to categories or activities that are not gendered or raced,
because they are associated with whites, men, or other nonmarked
"majority" groups. In this respect, devaluation is not a radical departure
from disparate treatment, but simply a supplement to the basic comparative
approach of the law.
In part because of the conceptual similarity between disparate
treatment and devaluation, I see no basis for refusing to treat devaluation as
a legal injury in the proper case. When there is convincing evidence that an
activity or conduct has been devalued because of its association with
women or racial minorities, persons harmed by the devaluation arguably
should have a legal remedy."' The cognitive bias that underlies
devaluation is not so radically different from the stereotyping that in the
past provided normative support for explicit gender classifications and that
today causes much of the garden-variety disparate treatment of individuals.
There is no good reason why the mental image of "things female" or "black
life" should convey a meaning of inferiority, deficiency, or lack of value,
unless one denies that women and racial minorities are as fully human as
white men. Although some people may escape the effects of devaluation
112. Whether the defendant, in a proper case, should be able to assert an affirmative defense such
as "business necessity" or some other cost justification to absolve itself of liability is difficult to
determine in the abstract. Most often, however, proof that the lower worth of an activity has indeed
been caused by its association with the gender or race of the prototypical actor will serve to rule out all
(or virtually all) other nondiscriminatory explanations for the evaluation. In this respect, proof of
devaluation is most like a showing of class-wide disparate treatment, which rarely can be defended on
the grounds that it is too expensive to purge the system of intentional bias. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-
2(k)(1), (2) (1994) ("a demonstration that an employment practice is required by business necessity may
not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional discrimination"). Devaluation arguably differs
from disparate impact theory, which permits defendants to escape liability for neutral policies that
cause group adverse impact, if they are proven to be necessary to the safe and efficient functioning of
the enterprise. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (1994) (codifying business necessity defense under
Title VII). Because, however, devaluation as I describe it is distinct from both disparate treatment and
disparate impact, the availability of defenses is an open question best left to be decided in concrete
cases.
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by, for example, working in a male-dominated job, devaluation is often no
less pernicious than disparate treatment. It can produce substantial,
negative material effects and has the vexing capacity to reproduce gender
and race disparities that seem to have little to do with a particular
individual's gender or race.
If devaluation were more widely acknowledged as a form of bias,
legal struggles could center more productively on remedy, where there are
often difficult issues of how to go about implementing the goal of
neutrality. In its simplest terms, the remedy for devaluation is to upgrade
the devalued activity, which most often means treating it the same as the
"male" or "white" activity is treated.'1 3 But removing bias from a system
may call for more creative responses. The Baldus study, for example,
provided justification for refusing to impose the death penalty in the class
of cases in which the danger of the "race of the victim" effect was most
pronounced-the midrange cases, which were neither the most aggravated
nor the least aggravated.114  Additionally, the implementation of
comparable worth may require more than simply a one-shot pay increase
for workers in female-dominated jobs; it may entail some job restructuring
and monitoring of pay ranges. Because devaluation is systemic in nature, it
may also be hard to tell whether the applied remedy has been effective.
One way to discover whether the goal of neutrality has been achieved,
however, is to see whether a gender or race association persists. For
example, if the job is no longer commonly regarded as a woman's job, it is
probably no longer devalued. These remedial complexities, however,
should not detract from the basic point of this Article that devaluation is a
form of bias that the law should address when a satisfactory remedy can be
devised.115
113. In some cases, however, it may be preferable to downgrade the value of the -male" or the
"white" activity in addition to upgrading the value of the "female" or "minority" activity. This remedy
for devaluation would accomplish equalization by taking away the privilege of the dominant group and
setting the new norm at a level that reflects the values of both activities. See. e.g., Chanmllas.
Economic Data in Tort Litigation, supra note 107, at 122-23 (arguing that %%hen individualized
assessment of damages is impossible, loss of future earning capacity in personal injury cases should
reflect the average wages of both men and women, regardless of the gender of the plaintiff).
114. Baldus found that the effects of racial bias were most striking in the midrange cases: 14A%
of the black victim midrange cases received the death penalty, and 34.4% of the %%hite victim midrange
cases received the death penalty. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 n.5 (1987).
115. It should be noted that the remedy for devaluation need not come from the courts-it may
take the form of legislative or regulatory initiatives. Implementation of comparable worth, for example,
was accomplished by legislation in Ontario, Canada. See Agarwval. supra note 77.
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III. BIASED PROTOTYPES
In addition to the cognitive bias underlying the processes of
devaluation, another recurring theme in feminist and critical race
commentary concerns the harmful effects of stock images, mental portraits,
schemas, or cultural scripts (all of which I place under the heading of
"prototypes") that operate to limit the law's protection of marginal social
groups. The literature on rape, for example, repeatedly mentions the
stranger-rape prototype and the prototypical rapist, charging that reliance
on these prototypes infected legal judgments about criminality and
victimization and prevented many date and acquaintance rapes from being
classified as "real rapes" and as crimes.116 Narrow prototypes of this sort
often surface in nonintegrated contexts, in which there is rarely a
comparable group of male or white victims or affected class members.
Discussions of harmful prototypes may arise, for example, when scholars
try to explain the effects of gender bias on largely female groups, e.g., bias
against welfare mothers." 7 Additionally, the body of literature concerned
with prototypes tends to address "second generation" questions, like why
reforms in the law, such as changes in rape doctrine and evidentiary rules,
have not been more effective and how bias gets reproduced in successive
generations. In this Article, I refer to "biased prototypes" to convey the
sense that there is something skewed or unfair about reliance on such
prototypes in these contexts. I sense that, like devaluation, the use of
biased prototypes is a form of cognitive bias that affects judgments of
value.
In general, persons use prototypes as "cognitive shortcuts" to help
them categorize new cases and situations."' When a person "reasons"
from a prototype, whether by conjuring up a prototypical victim, offender,
or event, he or she searches for a family resemblance between the new case
and the prototypical case. The more the new case looks like the prototype
(for example, by sharing common features of the prototype), the more
likely it will be classified as falling within the category. Resort to
prototypical reasoning provides a contrast to the classical model of
116. See infra Part II.B.
117. See infra Part III.C.
118. See Neal R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors Think About
Causation, Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 85, 93-95 (1995); Stuart P.
Green, Prototype Theory and the Classification of Offenses in a Revised Model Penal Code: A General
Approach to the Special Part, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 301 (2000). For an accessible discussion of
prototype theory and the contributions of major scholars in the field, see GEORGE LAKOFF, WOME3N,
FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987).
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classification, in which inclusion within the category is determined by
whether the new case fulfills some particular set of necessary and sufficient
conditions, e.g., whether the conduct satisfies all the elements of a crime or
a cause of action. In the classical model, no one case is more typical or
central than any other case; the fixed boundaries of the classical model
establish the new case either as falling within or outside the definition. In
contrast, boundaries set by prototypes are often graded or "fuzzy"--some
cases are seen as more typical than others, as better examples of the
category than others. If the new case has many features resembling the
prototype, it will be regarded as a good representative of the category, even
if those features are not, strictly speaking, necessary for membership in the
category according to the classical definition. 119
The sexism or racism complained about in the biased prototype
context is not typically articulated in comparative terms. The basic claim is
not that, under similar circumstances, men or whites have been (or would
be) treated better or even that a category has been devalued because of its
association with a low status social group. Thus, the recurring
contemporary criticism of rape law, for example, is not that male rape
victims are treated better than female rape victims or even that the law
against rape would be more stringently enforced if the majority of rape
victims were men instead of women (i.e., if rape were not gender-coded as
a form of female victimization). Instead, the claim is that the law is
interpreted and enforced in a biased way that denies protection to large
numbers of female victims, both white and minority, who deserve its
protection. In the process, moreover, a message is conveyed that their
harm is not real, or substantial, or worthy of legal redress.120 There is not
yet a term in the legal vocabulary that captures this form of bias. I call
these cases of "biased prototypes."
At the core of the complaint is that the mental image of the
prototypical case (including the image of the prototypical offender, victim
or category member) infects the process of judgment in a systematically
biased way. The prototype is biased in that it does not reflect the typical or
average case. Nor do the features of the prototypical case always map the
crucial legal elements of the crime, cause of action, or entitlement to
governmental benefits. This skewing can be harmful because reference to
the prototype can distort decisions about whether specific instances belong
in the category. The critical question is subtly transformed: The
119. See Vicli L Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: La Representation of Legal Concepts. 61
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 857, 859 (1991).
120. See infra text accompanying notes 130, 142-45.
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decisionmaker assesses the similarity of the new case to the prototype,
rather than evaluating whether the case fulfills the requirement for
membership in the category, i.e., whether the new case fits within the legal
definition.' 2 ' Over time, moreover, the existence of the prototype may
actually operate to narrow or to alter the legal category if legal
commentators and actors within the legal system treat the legal category as
if it were bounded by the attributes of the prototype and go on to construct
models and rationales centered on the biased prototype.
The legal literature discussing biased prototypes tends to be of the
"applied" variety, evaluating a particular prototype in a given context,
identifying the ways in which the prototype departs from the typical or
recurring case, and suggesting how the prototype subtly serves to reinforce
traditional attitudes and ideologies and prevent more thoroughgoing reform
of the law and larger society. This Article theorizes more generally about
those characteristics of biased prototypes that make them effective in
containing social change, particularly how they can function to reproduce
gender and race hierarchies in the name of law reform. I focus here on
three characteristics, overlapping to some degree, that are highlighted in the
three examples of biased prototypes I examine below. 122
A. THREE CHARACTERISTICS OF BIASED PROTOTYPES
Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the biased prototypes I
describe here is their lack of representativeness. Contrary to expectations,
the prototypical case frequently does not resemble the typical case. It does
not mark what is usual (in the sense of average) from what is unusual.
Instead, the prototype seems to do its work on the prescriptive or normative
level, rather than on the descriptive level. It constructs a line between
121. See Lu-in Wang, The Complexities of "Hate", 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 804 (1999) (describing
the dangers of reasoning via prototypes).
122. Three other examples of biased prototypes that I do not analyze in this Article but that exhibit
the three general characteristics discussed infra are 1) the prototype of a stalker as an obsessed fan who
stalks a celebrity, rather than the more typical targeting of domestic violence victims, see CAROLINE A.
FORELL & DONNA M. MATrHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN 125-35 (2000); 2) the prototype of the
domestic violence victim as a woman suffering from battered women's syndrome who kills her abuser
in his sleep, rather than a woman who confronts and resists her abuser and often suffers injury when she
tries to leave or refuses to return, see Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991); Nourse, supra note 38, at 1345 (1997);
and 3) the prototype of sexual harassment as a quid pro quo incident involving a male supervisor
making sexual advances toward a female subordinate, rather than pervasive gender-based hostility (of a
nonsexual nature) directed at women employees by their male supervisors and coworkers, see Vicki
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1686 (1998) (describing the
prevailing paradigm).
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normalcy and deviancy, between the acceptable and the unacceptable. In
the criminal law context, for example, the prototypical offender may be
cast as deviant, while indirectly excusing or minimizing the harm done by
offenders who do not match the prototype. The prototype can also be
influential in constructing a class of "true" or "real" or "worthy" victims,
making it harder for those who are injured or affected in ways that do not
fit the prototype to have their interests understood or redressed in law.
Particularly when the prototype is narrow and covers only a small
percentage of cases that arguably could come within a legal category,
reliance on prototypes may make it seem reasonable to deny legal
protection to a large number of persons, the vast majority of whom will be
women or other marginalized social groups. Overall, the danger is that the
prototypical may be mistaken for the typical, creating the false sense that
the core of the problem has been addressed.
The second dynamic of the biased prototypes I discuss below is that
the prototypes reflect or carry with them a theory about the causation of
social events. The causal story behind the prototype, the attribution of
cause to effect that takes place when the prototype is used to categorize a
new case, seems to have a particular structure. The implicit causal
explanation supporting the prototype highlights the character or
disposition of the individual actor, and discounts or ignores those
situational or social factors that may contribute to or even determine the
outcome. This tendency to attribute behavior to character and not
situations, to miss the social context and overemphasize the psychological
dimension, is known in the social cognition literature as the "fundamental
attribution error.""12 Critical theorists such as Duncan Kennedy describe
prototypes as narratives or scripts, in which a "code" provided by the script
tells us why the actors behaved as they did. The conventional code of
meaning need not follow the actor's actual intention: Instead, the
complexity of the actor's actual motivations is eclipsed by the simpler
cultural meaning, which emphasizes character traits. 124 Andrew Taslitz
explains that prototypes often carry with them scripts (or schemas) that
"explain the relationship between social events over time with a causal
flavor, early events producing or enabling later ones, much like the scenes
in a cartoon strip."' 25
123. FIsKE & TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 67-72; Fiske, supra note 10, at 357, 369-70. See also
NEAL FFIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORs THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENrs 57-58 (2000.
124. DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETc. 133 (1993).
125. Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the Courtroom. 5 S.
CAL. REV. L & WOMEN's STuD. 387, 416 (1996) (citing RICHARD NzsBET & LEE Ross. HutmA
INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 34 (1980)).
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In law, this causal attribution process can have a profoundly
conservative effect. The focus on individual psychology often increases
the chance that existing power distributions will remain unchallenged and
undisturbed and that victims will be blamed for their own misfortune. It
also means that pervasive harm produced by "normal" persons will not be
recognized.
Finally, the prototypes described here, and reasoning by reference to
prototypes generally, exacerbate the tendency to frame legal issues in
dichotomous terms. The inquiry boils down to whether the case fits within
the prototype or departs from the prototype. This simplified process
focuses attention on whether the case before us matches the causal script
embedded in the prototype. When the critical task becomes a search for
one, exclusive cause of the behavior in question,' 26 behavior that is the
product of multiple causes gets ruled outside the category. The failure to
deal adequately with cases of mixed motivation, a recurring theme in
antidiscrimination law, has a disproportionately negative effect on socially
marginalized groups who rarely are able to pin down their disadvantage to
a single source. Moreover, the search for a discrete, unitary cause of
behavior or harm falls to capture the mutually reinforcing relationship
between social context on the one hand and individual motivation or
character on the other. The disempowerment that accompanies social
marginalization is likely to be seen as situated solely within the person,
unless the social structures that help make the person "who she is" are
exposed and analyzed as relevant in the law.
B. STRANGER-RAPE PROTOTYPE
The best-known example of the distorting effects of a biased prototype
involves the law of rape. Despite the movement to reform and strengthen
rape laws spearheaded by feminists in the mid- 1970s and persisting to this
day, it is still probably the case that the incidence of rape has not decreased
substantially and that the conviction rate for those charged with rape
remains lower than conviction rates for other serious crimes. 127  For
126. This preference for simple causal explanations has been termed the "preference for
monocausality" by cognitive psychologists. FEIGENSON, supra note 123, at 51-52.
127. CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND
ITS IMPACT 159-75 (1992) (noting that rape law reforms have generally not increased the likelihood of
conviction, and that reforms have only modestly increased reporting and likelihood of indictment). See
also STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF
LAW 17-46 (1998) (discussing disappointing results of feminist-inspired reforms in rape law since the
1970s).
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example, Duncan Kennedy speaks of the "tolerated residuum" to describe
the quantum of sexual abuse that remains unreported and unpunished. 12
To explain the disparity between the legal condemnation of rape and
the inadequacy of rape law enforcement, many feminist scholars point to
the influence of stock images and common misperceptions surrounding the
crime of rape.129 The charge is that a form of cognitive bias has operated to
construct a prototype of rape and of the prototypical rapist that does not
correspond to most rape victims' experience.' 30 The result is that a large
portion of behavior that fits the legal definition of rape-forcible
penetration without the consent of the victim-is often not regarded or
treated as "real rape." Susan Estrich's book Real Rape popularized the
view that only a narrow class of rape cases has been taken seriously under
the law, in both the past and the present. She described the "stranger rape"
prototype, the image of rape committed by a stranger who inflicts or
threatens physical injury.131 This image of a man jumping from the bushes
to attack a woman is conjured up by the word "rape." The harm of the
stranger-rape prototype is not simply that it is underinclusive. Admittedly,
no prototype captures the entirety of the category it represents. Rather, the
prototype is biased, and causes harm, because of its tendency to redirect
our attention from the vast majority of rapes, which are committed by
persons who have had some previous acquaintance with the victim.132 By
erasing date, acquaintance, and marital rapes, the stranger-rape prototype
128. KENNEDY, supra note 124, at 137.
129. See, e.g., Mary L Coombs, Telling the Victim's Story, 2 TE. J. WO.IEN & L 277, 280-86
(1993) (discussing cultural myths about rape, rape victims, and offenders): Morrison Torrey. Wien Will
We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions. 24 U.C. DAViS L RE%,.
1013, 1022-31 (1991) (discussing myths about rape victims and offenders).
130. See e.g., LYNDA LYTLE HOL.STROM & ANN \voU3ERT BURGESS. THE VICTim OF RAPE:
INSTrrTUTONAL REACtnONs 42-44 (1978) (describing prosecutors' and police officers' notion of the
"ideal rape" that is most likely to be prosecuted); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEItIST
THEORY OF THE STATE 175 (1989) (discussing societal views of "rapable" and "unrapable" womn);
Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEx. J. WOMvEN & L 41.
73 (1993) (detailing continuum of cultural understanding of rape and consensual heterosexual sex. from
"complete stranger, interracial (black on white)" to "mutual desire, love, care, communication"); Aviva
Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape Trials, 49 HASTILGS LIJ.
663, 677-84 (1998) (discussing the cultural paradigm of rape).
131. SUsAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 4 (1987). See also Susan Estrich. Rape, 95 YALE LI. 1037.
1092 (1986).
132. One 1992 study found that only 22% of women reporting rape were raped by strangers. In
contrast, 9% were raped by husbands, 10% by boyfriends, 16% by other relatives, and 29,7 by per-sns
they knew but who were not relatives. NAT'L VICTI.M CTR. & CRLME VICTIMS RESEARCH &
TREATMENT CrR., RAPE IN AMERIC.A: A REPORT TO THE NATION 4 fig.4 (1992). See also ROBERT T.
MICHAEL, JOHN H. GAGNON, EDWARD 0. LAUMANN & GINA KOLATA. SEx N A.MtEI~cA: A
DEFINE SURVEY 225 (1994) (reporting that all but 4% of women stating that they were forced to
have sex knew the man who was forcing them).
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can transform rape from a pervasive phenomenon into an isolated one.
Additionally, if rape is conceptualized as being committed by a violent
stranger, encounters that do not fit the prototype will tend to be
characterized as "consensual," even when there is little evidence that the
woman actually wanted to have sexual intercourse.
Andrew Taslitz contends that a familiar theme in the cultural scripts
surrounding rape, which supports and explains the reluctance to treat
acquaintance and date rapes as "real" rapes, is the theme of bullying. In his
view, a "bully" directs his aggression at an opponent who has no real
chance of winning (i.e., a totally helpless victim). A perpetrator will be
designated a bully only if he displays a great deal of aggression, including
physical aggression. A "normal" amount of verbal and physical aggression
will be tolerated under male-oriented conceptions of sex as an instrumental
activity, a game in which there are inevitably winners and losers. Echoing
Catharine MacKinnon's early critique of legal definitions of consent,133
Taslitz argues that date and acquaintance rapes in which the aggressors use
only "acceptable levels" of force are not "real" rapes because they are not
committed by bullies. Prosecutors in date rape trials then face the
formidable task of portraying the defendant as "a monster, a beast, or, at
the very least, a bully."'134
The stranger-rape prototype also has a racial dimension: The stranger
in the prototypical rape is often visualized as a black man who attacks a
white woman. Simply by being black, offenders in interracial rapes are
often cast as "strangers" as the prototypical rape evokes an implicit
racialized image. Although most rapes are intraracial, the black
offender/white victim rape produces the strongest legal response, perhaps
because it is the prototype. When the offender is black and the victim is
white, the rape is more likely to result in a conviction, and black men
convicted of rape tend to receive harsher penalties than do other sexual
assault defendants.1 35  Commentators have noted that the usual
133. E.g., MACKINNON, supra note 130, at 174-77.
134. Taslitz, supra note 125, at 452-53.
135. See GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT 132 (1989). The pattern of harsher punishment for black men accused of raping
white women simultaneously discriminates against black men and devalues the autonomy and physical
integrity of women of color. See Kimberld Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway? Femnist and
Antiracist Appropriations of Anita Hill, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON
ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 402, 419 (Toni
Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER]; Kimbcrld Crenshaw,
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43
STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1269 (1991) (citing Dallas study showing that average prison term for a man
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presumption in favor of treating aggression as consensual sex is reversed
when the victim is white and the defendant is black.1
3 6
The rape prototype may also serve to exceptionalize rape by
suggesting that only certain types of men are likely to rape; that is, the
prototype of the action becomes linked to a specific kind of perpetrator
(prototypical rapist). Katherine Baker characterizes the prevailing view as
based on the belief that "rape is different from other crimes because rapists
are 'crazy.' 137 Similarly, Duncan Kennedy believes that the "common
popular assessment of sexual abuse" is that it is pathological behavior,
quoting Senator Orrin Hatch as stating that abusers are "not normal."" s
This psychopathological model of the rapist oversimplifies the multiple
motivations that may cause men to rape. Arguing that not all rapes are
alike, Baker asserts that "some rapes are predominantly about sex, some
rapes are predominantly about masculinity, and some rapes are
predominantly about domination."'139 In a gang rape, for example, men
may rape to impress the other men and bring unity to the group (i.e., to
reinforce the meaning of masculinity). The motivation for a young date
rapist may be more directly linked to a desire for sex, combined with a
commodified view of sex that minimizes the harm to the unwilling woman.
The tendency to reduce rapists to mentally ill sadists who have an urge
to rape increases the risk of missing the more common scenarios of
victimization and fails to convey the pervasiveness and complexity of rape.
The prototypical rapist is a deviant individual, whereas many sexual
offenders may simply be normal individuals who have committed a serious
crime.
A crucial question for scholars is to understand why the prototype
diverges from the typical or most common case. In dealing with social
categories, social psychologists have noted that people often do not focus
on the central tendency (mode, median) but on the extreme or ideal case.
The selection of the prototype thus seems to be functional-it performs a
convicted of raping a black woman was two years, as compared to five years for the rap of a Latina
and ten years for the rape of an Anglo woman).
136. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Representation: The Power of Discourse,
Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction of Heterose-viality, 49 VAND. L RE%. 869 (1996).
137. Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law. 110
HARV. L. REV. 563,565 (1997).
138. KENNEDY, supra note 124, at 138.
139. Baker, supra note 137, at 566.
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goal or purpose.' 40 This does not mean that an individual who resorts to
the prototype is aware of the goal or even approves of the goal. Rather, it
seems that the rape prototype functions subtly to reinforce certain social
hierarchies. First, it reinforces male dominance and female powerlessness
by giving (some) men sexual access to women they know. The balance of
power in marriage, in intimate relationships between unmarried persons,
and even in nonsexual relationships between coworkers or other
acquaintances is skewed if women realize that their claims of rape will be
met with skepticism. There may also be repercussions beyond the victim
and the abusers. The fear of rape curtails women's freedom and their
ability to act with confidence in negotiating the risks of everyday life.
Even women who have not been raped engage in a variety of self-
protective measures or coping strategies designed to prevent rape: One
study found that women avoid going out at night without a male protector,
wear modest shoes and dress when out alone, and avoid preferred public
activities if alone.141 Many women believe that they can avoid rape (or at
least lessen the odds of being raped) provided they do not "assume the
risk." In this way, patriarchal norms about the way women should behave
(particularly that women should be passive, modest, and under male
protection) are reproduced and reenacted, even by those who claim not to
embrace the ideology.
The narrow prototype of rape also reinforces white domination by
using the threat of a charge of rape against black men to limit their
freedom. Because of the racialized history of rape laws and law
enforcement, Angela Harris explains that for all black people, men and
women alike, "'rape' signified the terrorism of black men by white men,
aided and abetted, passively (by silence) or actively (by 'crying rape'), by
white women." 142  Jennifer Wriggins further asserts that the racialized
prototype harms women of all races by implicitly condoning all but the
paradigmatic rapes and contributing to cultural denial that "rape is painful
and degrading to both Black and white victims regardless of the attacker's
race."'143 The harm of rape is trivialized by seeing it as a justifiable
140. See Lawrence W. Barsalou, Ideals, Central Tendency, and Frequency of Instantiation as
Determinants of Graded Structure in Categories, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING,
MEMORY & COGNITION 628, 632 (1985) (discussing goal-derived categories).
141. MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR 15-22 (1989).
142. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,
599 (1990). See also PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE,
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 177-78 (1990).
143. Jennifer Wriggins, Note, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 117
(1983) (footnotes ommitted). See also Harris, supra note 142, at 581.
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response to a woman's risky behavior. Although it is commonly said that
"no one deserves to be raped," relabeling rape as consensual behavior when
the woman's actions depart from that of the ideal victim in effect creates a
defense to rape. The "misunderstandings" as to consent in a date rape
situation, for example, may involve normative judgments about the
propriety of a woman's behavior (e.g., being out at night without a man)
that are not directly related to her desire for sexual relations.
Particularly if prototypes do not serve to mark the typical or most
common case, they function to set the standard by which others are judged,
as implicit theories or judgments about the relative seriousness of acts
within a certain category. Thus, there may be the implicit judgment that
the more the rape departs from the prototype, the less serious the harm.
The crucial question then becomes why, for example, is the rape of a white
woman by a black stranger considered to be more serious than an intra-
racial date rape? Is it that women have less to fear from men they know,
even though empirical evidence indicates that intimates are just as likely to
inflict bodily harm? 44 Is it that it is somehow more degrading to have
one's wishes disregarded by a stranger, although many women report that it
is a devastating experience to be betrayed by a man they trust? 145 Is it that
it is worse to be forced to have sex with someone of another race, although
surely that attitude would be regarded as racist by most people including
rape victims who believe in racial equality? Although these questions are
144. See CALLIE MARIE RENNIsON & SARAH WELcHANs. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE. INrTLArE
PARTNER VIOLENCE 2 (2000) (female victims more likely to suffer violence at hands of an intimate than
in an incident committed by a stranger); Dean G. Kilpatrick, Connie L Best. Benjamin E. Saunders &
Lois J. Veronen, Rape in Marriage and in Dating Relationships: How Bad Is It for Mental Health?. 528
AN AS N.Y. AcAD. ScL 335, 342 (1988) (victims are no more likely to be physically assaulted by
strangers than by husbands and boyfriends).
145. See ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 102 (1997) ("[Tlhe fact that the harm is suffered
because of the actions of intimates compounds it: the harm is one of invasion as well as violence, and of
betrayal and exposure as well as fear."); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM. SEX & SOCIAL JUsTIcE 143 (1999)
("[Marital rape] represents a surrender of control over a woman's sexual choices, something modern
women view as a serious harm."). Comparing marital rape to stranger rape, one commentary asserted:
Stranger rape is a devastating one-time occurrence .... Marital rape victims often suffer from
a debilitating psychological dependency that ties them to their abusive husbands. Frequently,
these wives are also battered. One study found that fifty-two percent of the victims of marital
rape suffer severe long-term effects as compared to thirty-nine percent of the victims of
stranger rape.
Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L
REV. 1255, 1261-62 (1986) (footnotes omitted). See also Kilpatrick et al., supra note 144. at 343
("[W]omen assaulted by spouses or dates were just as likely as those assaulted by strangers to be
depressed, fearful, obsessive-compulsive, and sexually dysfunctional years after the assault."); Mark A.
Whatley, For Better or Worse: The Case of Marital Rape, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 29. 33 (19931
(Marital rape victims "have a hard time trusting men; an increased phobia of intimacy and sex. and a
lasting fear of being sexually assaulted again:').
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not easy to answer, this is the line of questioning that promises to unearth
the cognitive bias in the implementation of rape laws.
By teasing out the value judgments behind "selection" of the
prototype, we can begin to perceive the bias that infects the category. One
major theme of feminist criticism of rape law, for example, has been that
the injury of rape has been conceptualized not as the loss of sexual
autonomy, but as the degradation of being "taken" by the wrong man. 146
The rape prototype draws the line between normalcy and deviancy. It
normalizes sexual aggression when the man has some relationship with a
woman (e.g., as husband, lover, or even boss) and makes it extremely
difficult to prosecute such cases. The prototype also subtly determines
what is deviant for women. Behavior that departs from the feminine
stereotype of appropriate behavior for the modest, passive woman is
marked as deviant by taking it outside the law's protection, signaling that
the law is reserved for serious injuries to normal women. 147
The narrow rape prototype also focuses attention on the psychology of
the actors in the rape scenario, diverting attention from causal explanations
for the rape that would highlight situational or social factors. The
fundamental attribution error is evident when a rape is simplistically
explained by labeling the rapist as crazy or a bully, or when a rape is
denied or diminished by calling the victim promiscuous or vindictive.
What is missing from such accounts premised on the character of the actors
is the importance of opportunity (e.g., the offender had contact alone with
the victim) and disparities in power (e.g., the offender was the victim's
employer or husband upon whom she was economically dependent) as
causal explanations for the rape. By eclipsing the contexts in which rapes
occur and the social factors that contribute to rape, the prototype makes it
more difficult to see how rape is related to other forms of violence and
abuse of women.
Finally, resorting to the stranger-rape prototype, with its emphasis on
physical aggression and violence, tends to exacerbate the already
146. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women's Antonony, 69 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 359 (1993).
147. Lynne Henderson has identified the following "functions" served by the rape prototype
(which she calls the stereotype of rape):
It enables many men who have forced their partners to have sex to distinguish their actions
from those of "a rapist"; its threatening horror maintains control over many women's freedom
and activity; it allows most men who do commit the crime of rape to go unpunished; and it
prevents many women who are raped by men they know from complaining to authorities or
seeking counseling, because they fail to meet the societal standard for what it means to have
been raped.
Henderson, supra note 37, at 133.
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pronounced tendency in the law to categorize sexual encounters in
dichotomous terms as either "real" rapes or consensual sex. This
oversimplified analysis hinders understanding of the many exploitive
sexual encounters in which coercive pressure to have sex takes a form other
than overpowering physical force. Particularly when the party initiating
sex occupies a position of power and trust over the target-as in the
increasing number of cases involving doctors, lawyers, drill sergeants, and
other professionals who pressure and manipulate those under their care and
supervision 14--reliance on the narrow prototype tends prematurely to label
these encounters as consensual sex, missing the often obvious coercive
elements that underlie the target's decision to submit. In these difficult
cases of professional abuse, the motivation of the perpetrator is particularly
hard to pin down and cannot easily be reduced to a singular desire for
domination, sexual gratification, or love and intimacy. In such cases of
mixed motivation, the departure from the prototype makes it harder to
characterize the behavior as rape. Reliance on the narrow rape prototype
thus makes it unlikely that legal decisionmakers will have the necessary
incentive to examine the facts of particular encounters closely enough to
determine whether they fulfill the legal definition of rape or criminal sexual
abuse.
C. THE PROTOTYPE OF THE 'WELFARE MOTHER"
Another well-theorized biased prototype is most prominent in legal
contexts outside of the criminal law. This is the prototype of the "welfare
mother." The phrase has become synonymous with a woman who receives
AFDC benefits and serves as a contrast to the unmodified or "normal"
mother who does not rely on AFDC to support herself and her family. The
recent debates over welfare reform at both the state and federal level have
focused scholars' and commentators' attention on the cultural image that
has become associated with welfare mothers. The negative prototype has a
history. The term "welfare queen" was popularized in the 1970s and
evoked the negative image of a woman who lives royally "off the dole,"
acting as if she were entitled to support 49 Perhaps the most famous
invocation of the prototype of the "welfare queen" came during the
148. For a discussion of professional abuse cases, see STEPHEN J. SCHULLUOFER. UNWANTED SEX:
THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 168-253 (1998) (discussing sexual
encounters between employers and employees, teachers and students, doctors and patients, and lawyers
and clients); Martha Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Ser Scandals and the Military.
83 MiN. L. REV. 305, 346-50 (1998) (discussing sex between drill sergeants and recruits).
149. See Tonya L. Brito, Fron Madonna to Proletariat: C'onstruciing a New Ideology of
Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VLL L. REV. 415 (1999).
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testimony of Justice Clarence Thomas at his Senate confirmation hearing.
Thomas described his sister, who apparently received AFDC, as being
caught up in a culture of poverty. Thomas explained that she was so
dependent on welfare that she got angry when the mailman was late with
her monthly check and that she had no motivation to do better or change
her situation.15
0
Particularly in the last decade, with the concern for "crack babies" and
the frequent lament about "children having children," the dominant image
of the welfare mother has shifted from "welfare queen" to that of a black,
dependent, teenage mother who is dependent on both drugs and welfare.
"Welfare mother" now tends to suggest a black woman who has several
children and who has never held a job. The prototypical welfare mother
defines dependency in our culture and exemplifies a condition that is
analogous to an addiction (i.e., drug dependency), separating the dependent
individual from self-reliant persons capable of acting in their own
interest.151
The prototypes of the welfare mother, however, do not accurately
describe the average or typical woman receiving AFDC. Fewer than forty
percent of AFDC recipients are African American. 152  Most mothers
receiving aid are adults, not teenagers: Only approximately eight percent of
recipients are teenage mothers, and more than half that group are age
eighteen or nineteen.153 The average family on welfare is not made up of a
woman with a brood of children, but includes fewer than three persons,
counting the adults.154 There is also no clear demarcation between welfare
mothers and other mothers with respect to the sources of support they
receive for their families. Women frequently go on and off welfare
between intervals of paid employment. 155 This makes welfare mothers
150. The Thomas quote is cited and discussed in Wahneema Lubiano, Black Ladies, Welfare
Queens, and State Minstrels: Ideological War by Narrative Means, in RACE-ING JuSTICE, EN-
GENDERING POWER, supra note 135, at 323, 339, 362 n.6.
151. Nancy Dowd notes that the "pathological label" attached to welfare mothers does not apply
to women who are dependent on their husbands within a marriage. NANcY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF
SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES 101 (1997) ("[Ihe welfare reform rhetoric clearly views dependence on a
spouse (marriage) as healthy; it is dependence on the state that is not.").
152. Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform
Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 744 (1992) (statistics from 1990).
153. Sylvia A. Law, Ending Welfare as We Know It, 49 STAN. L. REV. 471, 482 (1997) (review
essay).
154. Minow, supra note 43, at 838 (citing 1990 statistics, average AFDC family had 2.9 members,
including adults; 72% of all families on AFDC had only one or two children, and almost 90% had Three
or fewer children).
155. Law, supra note 153, at 476. Many welfare recipients also do wage work "off the books" to
try to make up for the gap between welfare benefits and family needs. DOWD, supra note 151, at 100.
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look very much like other mothers, who also frequently engage in part-time
or temporary employment. 156
The biased prototypes of the welfare mother have had a significant
adverse effect on the entire group of aid recipients. Feminist scholars have
contended that the intensely negative images of the welfare mother have
made it easier for governments to enact punitive welfare reform measures
and to treat AFDC as radically different from other programs of public
subsidies.157 Although principally affecting public benefit schemes rather
than the enforcement of criminal law, the welfare mother prototype, like
the stranger-rape prototype, functions to narrow legal protection for this
large class of women.1 58 In this context, the prototype may have its
principal effects on legislators and bureaucrats who create and enforce
welfare policy. The prototypes of the "welfare mother" cast families
receiving AFDC as deviant and erroneously suggest that normal or "real"
families do not receive public subsidies.
The prototype has contributed to the public acceptance and passage of
legislation aimed at modifying the personal behavior of welfare mothers.
For example, welfare mothers have been given monetary bonuses for
marrying the fathers of their children ("bridefare"), have had their welfare
payments cut off or reduced if they give birth to children while receiving
welfare ("family caps"), and have been threatened with termination of
benefits if their children miss more than a specified number of school days
("learnfare").1 5 9 In other families, such decisions about marriage,
reproductive choice, and childrearing practices are generally left to the
judgment of the parents. Welfare mothers, however, are not permitted to
act as heads of their own households with the same authority and dignity as
other custodial parents.
156. See WLIAMms, supra note 70. at 2 (reporting that nearly two-thirds of mothers of child-
bearing age (between twenty-five and forty-five years of age) do not hold ful.time jobs).
157. See Minow, supra note 43. at 838.
158. The biased prototypes in the rape and welfare contexts do not operate identically. The
prototype in the welfare context serves to discourage public subsidy, rather than to provide a peeial
justification for legal protection for a narrow class of victims as it does in the prototypical rape scenario.
Moreover, all welfare recipients, even those who do not fit the negative protot)pe, are also
disadvantaged because of the negative associations attached to the entire category. Unlike in the rape
context, there is no disparity in protection within the category. Despite these differences. however, the
"welfare mother" prototype functions much like the "stranger rape" prototype: it normalizes non-AFDC
families and obscures the public subsidies received by middle class and other families. See Martha
Albertson Fineman, The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare "Reform", 36 SANTA CLARA L REV.
287, 288 (1996) ("We all live subsidized lives ... .
159. Williams, supra note 152, at 720.
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Women on welfare also lose much of their privacy. 160 They are often
required to reveal the details of their sex lives as part of paternity
proceedings designed to reimburse the state for welfare expenditures by
extracting child support from biological fathers. They are subjected to
supervision and regular visits by bureaucrats and social workers. The
surveillance of welfare mothers and their families is so prominent a feature
of these programs that scholars call these families "public" families, 161
stressing that receipt of AFDC funds converts the private family into an
overregulated entity in which it is presumed appropriate for the state to
intervene. 16
2
The negative prototypes of the welfare mother may have also made it
possible to enact strict workfare requirements as a condition of receiving
AFDC. As long as welfare was associated primarily with aid to widows
and largely restricted to white women, it was deemed appropriate for
mothers receiving aid to stay home and care for their children. The current
hostility toward welfare mothers began to emerge in the late 1960s when
the states were pressured to abide by federal requirements that made it
more difficult to exclude black women. 163  Early on, limited work
requirements were imposed on this new group of AFDC beneficiaries. The
insistence that recipients be made to work in order to remain eligible for
benefits has culminated in the massive contemporary workfare program,
which exempts only women who have children under one year of age.164
Dorothy Roberts argues that the high value placed on mothers staying
home to nurture their children in middle-class families is reversed with
respect to families receiving AFDC, reinforcing racist assumptions that, as
caretakers, black women have little that is positive to offer to their
children. 165
160. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Standards for Constitutional Review of Privacy-Ivading
Welfare Reforms: Distinguishing the Abortion-Funding Cases and Redeeming the Undue-Burden Test,
49 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4-12 (1996).
161. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 178 (1995) (noting that single-mother families are thought of
as "public" families justifying state intrusion and loss of privacy).
162. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND TIlE
MEANING OF LIBERTY 226-29 (1997) (discussing receipt of welfare as a waiver of privacy); Kathryn
Abrams, Complex Claimants and Reductive Moral Judgments: New Patterns in the Search for Equality,
57 U. PITT. L. REV. 337, 340, 343-44, 357 (1996) (discussing disproportionate surveillance of families
headed by poor women of color).
163. For discussions of racism in the history of welfare, see LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT
ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935, at 48, 87 (1994); ROBERTS,
supra note 162, at 203-08.
164. See Brito, supra note 149, at 430-35; Roberts, Black Mothers' Work, supra note 45.
165. Roberts, Black Mothers' Work, supra note 45, at 872-76.
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The ungenerous response to AFDC is not characteristic of all public
benefit programs that could properly be classified as welfare programs.
Instead only some subsidies are stigmatized, while others are woven into
the fabric of mainstream economic regulation.1 66 The structure of the
current system of social supports has been described as a "two-track
welfare system."167 In marked contrast to AFDC, first-track programs such
as old age insurance, unemployment, and benefits for families of veterans
are not generally called "welfare" and carry little stigma or dishonor.
There are no onerous work requirements attached to these benefits-the
surviving spouse of a veteran, for example, is entitled to receive benefits
for her children regardless of whether she is employed or is a full-time
homemaker. Other first-track programs such as the home mortgage
deduction are hidden subsidies that are regarded as entitlements, not
welfare.168
Overall, the unrepresentative prototype of the welfare mother as
single, black, and young sharply differentiates the group from other
mothers and obscures a more complex reality in which there is no such
clear-cut difference between welfare mothers and other mothers. The
subsidy that welfare mothers receive in the form of AFDC benefits is also
differentiated from other public subsidies whose first-track status makes
them appear more like entitlements than charity. The prototype serves to
draw a line bertween normalcy and deviancy, casting welfare mothers as
deviant and perpetuating the myth that normal families are fully self-
sufficient.
Like the rape prototype, the negative prototype of the welfare mother
also emphasizes the character or disposition of the woman receiving aid.
As mentioned above, the "fundamental attribution error" is the term used to
describe the tendency to attribute the cause of the other's behavior (e.g.,
being on welfare) as stemming from a fundamental character trait or
disposition of the other, rather than as a product of the situation confronting
the other. Starting perhaps with the famous 1965 Moynihan Report, a
causal link has been drawn among the "breakdown" of the black family, the
increasing number of black families on welfare, and the prevalence of
families headed by women.169 Rather than tracing problems in the family
to poverty (an external situation or condition), the cognitive move has been
166. See Edward J. McCaffery, The Burdens of Benefits. 44 ViLL L REv. 445.448-50(1999).
167. Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword1 of the U.S.
Welfare State, 19 SIGNs 309, 321 (1994).
168. See Fineman, supra note 158, at 288-89.
169. See ROBERTS, supra note 162, at 16.202-25.
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to attribute the cause of poverty to "deviant" families not dominated by
men. 170 A common narrative emerged describing a "culture of poverty"
through which welfare mothers transmitted bad values to their children and
reproduced dependency in the next generation. Critics of the psychological
(dispositional) approach stress that this tendency to address welfare
dependency as an individual pathology makes "welfare mothers" a much
less sympathetic group and renders invisible the ways in which AFDC
families are similar to "working poor" families or middle-class families.
The dispositional explanation has proven resilient, despite recurring
challenges that it fails to account for contemporary patterns. Sylvia Law,
for example, has challenged the empirical basis of the culture-of-poverty
thesis and the extent of intergenerational transmission of dependency,
citing statistics that indicate that over eighty percent of daughters who grew
up in "welfare" homes are not dependent on welfare themselves. 171 Causal
attribution is important in interpreting the data: Because poor people are
more likely to have children who are poor, it is not surprising that children
from welfare homes have a greater likelihood than do middle-class children
of being poor as adults and needing public assistance. The critical question
is whether poverty (and economic class) is regarded as the cause of welfare
dependency, or whether the "culture of poverty," as reflected in the
character of welfare mothers, is blamed. The fundamental attribution error
perpetuates the view that welfare mothers are the architects of their own
misfortune, shifting the focus away from the concrete social situations
facing women who receive welfare-the particulars of their lives-to the
psychology of the women themselves. 172
Finally, it is likely that the negative prototype of the "welfare mother"
has exacerbated the tendency of policymakers to focus on the psychology
and motivation of aid recipients as the sole cause of their continuing need
for welfare, obscuring other, more material causes that may prevent welfare
mothers from obtaining and retaining jobs. Aid recipients, for example,
who suffer violence at the hands of a boyfriend or partner may find it hard
to hold down a job because they periodically miss work following incidents
170. Maxine Baca Zinn calls this explanation of poverty and the underclass "the cultural
deficiency model" and contrasts it with explanations that focus on the "opportunity structures" in
society. See Maxine Baca Zinn, Family, Race, and Poverty in the Eighties, 14 SIGNS 856 (1989). See
also DowD, supra note 151, at 18-39 (disputing common beliefs that single-parent families cause
poverty and that families lacking a father harm children); Joel F. Handler, Woinen, Families, IWork, and
Poverty: A Cloudy Future, 6 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 375, 402 (1996) (concluding that the "problem" of
welfare dependency does not lie in the individuals, but in the job market and conditions of work).
171. Law, supra note 153, at 476.
172. See Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 539,575.
[Vol. 74:747
LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF BIAS
of physical abuse. Only recently has domestic violence been cited as an
additional cause of welfare dependency, 173 perhaps because of the tendency
to ascribe the problem exclusively to the culture of poverty. Moreover, it is
possible that, over time, a persistent situational factor, like the threat of
domestic violence, may serve to lessen a woman's desire and ability to seek
out a job.174 Such a mutually reinforcing relationship between social
context and individual motivation can be obscured by the prototype of the
"welfare mother" that seems to speak for itself.
D. THE PROTOTYPICAL "HATE" CRIME
The third example of a biased prototype-the prototypical "hate
crime"--is not yet as highly theorized as either the rape prototype or the
prototype of the welfare mother. Starting in the 1980s, state and federal
legislatures passed statutes enhancing the penalty for criminal conduct in
cases in which the defendant selected the victim "because of' or "by reason
of' the victim's social group status, most often his or her race, color,
religion, national origin, or sexual orientation. 175 Professor Lu-in Wang
has asserted that, along with the proliferation of statutes, a prototype of the
hate crime has emerged with the following features: In the prototype, the
perpetrator(s) and victim are strangers; the perpetrator selects the victim
because he hates or despises the social group to which the victim belongs;
the crime is characterized by extreme, gratuitous violence or the destruction
of property; and nothing of material value is taken from the victim.176
Despite the use of the label "hate crime" to describe this type of
discriminatory conduct, it is not at all clear that "hate" in the sense of
animus or hostility toward the individual victim or his or her group is or
should be an essential element of the crime. Instead, there is currently a
controversy over whether "hate crime" is a misnomer and whether
enhancement should apply to a considerably broader category of
discriminatory acts not primarily motivated by hate or animus. This is a
live legal controversy, because most enhancement statutes require only that
there be a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the
173. On the connection between welfare and domestic violence. see Lisa D. Brush. Harm.
Moralism, and the Struggle for the Soul of Feminism, 3 VIoI.EN E AGAINsr Wo.mN 237, 248-51
(1997); Joan Meier, Domestic Violence Character, and Social Change in the Welfare Reform Debate.
19 LAw & POL'Y 205,206-09 (1997).
174. See Jody Raphael, Domestic Violence and Welfare Receipt: Toward a New Feminist Theory
of Welfare Dependency, 19 HARv. WOM .E's LJ. 201,215 (1996).
175. See generally LU-IN WANXG, HATs Crtmms LAW. §§ 8.01-.04. 10.01-.05 2000)
(summarizing federal and state laws).
176. See Lu-in Wang, supra note 121, at 802-03.
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victim's social group. 177 Some courts and commentators believe that the
requisite statutory causal nexus is satisfied when there is a showing of
"discriminatory victim selection," that is, in cases in which the victim's
race or ethnicity was a substantial or motivating factor in the perpetrator's
choice of target, regardless of the perpetrator's subjective feelings toward
the victim. 178 Other commentators, in contrast, base their model of hate
crimes more closely on the prototype and contend that there should be no
enhancement of penalties unless there is proof of racial or other
discriminatory animus. 179
The broader definition of a hate crime captures a wide variety of cases
in which the perpetrator targets a socially vulnerable group but arguably
acts opportunistically and not out of simple hate. Professor Wang gives the
example of a teenager who chooses to rob a grocery store owned by recent
immigrants from Asia. The teenager targets the immigrants because he
presumes that their difficulties with the English language and isolation
from the mainstream community will cause them not to use the local banks
and to keep a lot of cash on hand. The perpetrator also predicts that the
immigrant owners will be less likely to report the crime and to receive help
from the police. 180 Another common example of an opportunistic bias
crime is a gay-bashing in which the perpetrator joins his friends in
committing the crime to gain social approval from his peer group or to
make sure that they will not reject him for refusing to take part in this kind
of ritual masculine bonding. Scholars such as Wang, Charles Lawrence,
Richard Delgado, and Man Matsuda believe that such opportunistic
offenses deserve enhancement as much as crimes animated by hatred
alone.' 8 ' The crux of their argument is that opportunistic offenses produce
the same extended harms as "pure" hate crimes. In both instances, there is
177. Most laws follow model legislation drafted by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith,
which increases punishment where the defendant committed a crime "by reason of the actual or
perceived race, color, religion, national origin, or sexual oreientation of another individual or a group of
individuals." See Lu-in Wang, Recognizing Opportunistic Bias Crimes, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1399, 1406
n.47 (2000) (quoting ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, HATE CRIMES LAWS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 3
(1994)).
178. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 896 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Cal. 1995); People v. Nitz, 674
N.E.2d 802, 806-07 (Ill. App. CL 1996); In re Welfare of S.M.J., 556 N.W.2d 4, 6-7 (Minn. CI. App.
1996).
179. See, e.g., Frederick M. Lawrence, The Punishment of Hate: Toward a Normative Theory of
Bias-Motivated Crimes, 93 MICH. L. REV. 320, 339 (1994).
180. Lu-in Wang, The Transforming Power of "Hate": Social Cognition Theory and the Harms of
Bias-Related Crime 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 57 (1997).
181. See MARl J. MATSUDA, CHARLES R. LAWRENCE Ill, RICHARD DELGADO & KIMBERLI6
WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
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harm not only to the direct victims who recognize that their ethnicity or
sexual orientation has made them vulnerable to violence, but also to other
members of the targeted group who appreciate that they may well be
regarded as suitable victims by such "rational" offenders in the future.'8
Wang takes the argument a step further by questioning whether even the
prototypical cases are caused solely by hate. She maintains that even the
classic case of lynching in the Southern states from 1880 to 1930 is best
explained as a product of economic calculation and social power, rather
than stemming exclusively from a hatred of blacks. 18 3 She also attributes
the contemporary wave of anti-gay violence (often regarded as the
quintessential contemporary hate crime) to a complicated set of perpetrator
motivations, including the desire for social acceptance and material gain. 18
Despite the fact that the legal category of "hate crime" is broad
enough to encompass opportunistic offenses, there is a growing tendency to
interpret and to enforce enhancement statutes narrowly to reach only hate-
motivated actions.185 A narrow prototype of the hate crime, reminiscent of
the stranger-rape prototype, has emerged that excludes crimes committed
for mixed motives (e.g., material gain coupled with animosity toward the
target group) or crimes for which it is possible to construct some "rational"
explanation or purpose for the perpetrator's conduct, such as a juvenile
wishing to shock the adult community by defacing a synagogue with a
swastika. Law enforcement personnel in particular have tended to embrace
this narrow prototype of hate crime, in some cities drafting official
department policies limiting the definition of hate crimes to situations in
which hatred or bigotry is determined to be the exclusive motive for the
crime.' 8 6 Notably, the FBI guidelines for the classification of bias crimes
endorse such a narrow prototype: The guidelines instruct that certain
assaults accompanied by a robbery (where property such as a purse or a
wristwatch is taken) should not be classified as bias-motivated, even if the
182. Lu-in Wang, supra note 121, at 812.
183. Id. at 836-67. Wang relies heavily on STUART F. TOLAY & E.M. BECK. A FESTIVAL OF
VIOLENCE (1995); Jay Corzine, Lin Huff-Corzine & James C. Creech. 77Te Tenant Labor Market and
Lynching in the South: A Test of Split Labor Market Theory, 58 SoC. INQUIRY 261 (1988).
184. Lu-in Wang, supra note 121, at 871-94 (discussing GARY DAVID COMS'ocK. VIOLENCE
AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN (1991) and GREGORY M. HEREK. Psychological Heterosexism and
Anti-Gay Violence: The Social Psychology of Bigotry and Bashing, in HATE CRt.wIES: CO.FRONTI-NG
VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 149 (Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. Berrill eds., 1992)1.
185. Lu-in Wang, supra note 180, at 128-29.
186. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B*RrTH. HATE CRIMES: POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 16. 68 (1988).
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offender utters a racial or homophobic epithet during the crime. 187 The
reasoning is that robbery is not a "real" hate crime because the theft creates
ambiguity about the offender's real motives; thus, a mixed-motive situation
is implicitly treated as disqualifying. Additionally, the narrow prototype
has had considerable influence in the reporting of crimes by media and in
the popular discourse. Although the killing of Matthew Shepard has
generally been accepted as a hate crime (probably because of its extreme
brutality and the anti-gay remarks of the perpetrators), many early
newspaper accounts of the murder included the fact that Shepard's wallet
was stolen, suggesting that the robbery motive made the case more difficult
to characterize than it first appeared. 188
Reliance on the narrow prototype, rather than on the potentially more
expansive legal definition of a bias crime, likely reduces the incidence of
reported hate crimes to a significant degree, changing what might be
regarded as a major social problem into a relatively isolated phenomenon.
Admittedly, there are no empirical data indicating the percentage of
opportunistic crimes as compared to pure hate crimes, and thus we cannot
know with certainty that pure hate crimes are atypical within the legal
category of bias crimes. The prototype, however, very much reinforces the
belief that hate crimes are aberrational. The prototype constructs a line
between normalcy and deviancy, casting the hate crime perpetrator as
deviant, even among the class of criminals. This is because "normal"
criminals are thought to act for material gain or some other advantage,
while the hate crime perpetrator is portrayed as deviant and irrational and
acting out of blind prejudice. The deviancy of the prototypical perpetrator
leads to the common perception that hate crimes are rare, aberrational, and
isolated incidents. Racial incidents often tend to be described in the news
media as "isolated incidents" despite the long history of racial violence in
this country and the fact that the violence often follows a common script.I89
The move to narrow the legal category of bias crimes thus fits into the
dominant cultural belief that the civil rights and feminist movements of the
1960s and 1970s were successful in eradicating prejudice and that group-
based discrimination such as racism is no longer pervasive or systemic.
187. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, TRAINING GUIDE FOR HATE
CRIME DATA COLLECTION 21-22 (1997).
188. See James Brooke, Men Held in Beating Lived on the Fringes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1998, at
A16.
189. See David Bradley, Editorial, Texas Murder Was a Lynching, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
June 16, 1998, at 9B.
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The prototype also eclipses the situational factors that come into play
in the perpetrator's choice of victim, putting the focus instead on the
perpetrator's character or disposition as a "prejudiced" person. In the hate
crime context, the fundamental attribution error operates to obscure how
the social context can affect or construct the perpetrator's motivation to
target a victim of a particular social group. Wang reports that when social
scientists have examined even prototypical hate crimes (notably, lynching
and gay bashing), they have concluded that the perpetrator's aversion or
animus toward the group is not necessarily a fixed or preexisting state of
mind but is connected to the social context in which the crime takes place.
When hate is so dissected to expose its social dimension, we can see that
the social context can sometimes motivate an offender to act on the
prejudice of others; the social context can make it both conformist and
logical to discriminate in the selection of a victim; and the social context
can make discriminating in the choice of a victim conducive to personal
gain.190
Wang's analysis tracks Iris Young's account of oppression, which
describes violence against groups as a "social practice" that is "always at
the horizon of the social imagination, even for those who do not perpetrate
it."191 In effect, the larger culture has designated some groups as "suitable
victims," making it likely that perpetrators will consider them "easy
targets" and be ready to act in such a way as to exploit their social
vulnerabilities. For example, gay men are disproportionately susceptible to
robbery or extortion schemes because perpetrators often assume that gay
men will be reluctant to call the police if the circumstances surrounding the
crime (e.g., it took place in a gay bar) might publicly reveal their sexual
orientation and often act on the assumption that gay victims will not
receive full protection from the police. 192 The social forces that make it
risky for gay men to be open about their sexual orientation, and that reduce
the support they are likely to receive once victimized, constitute the
background against which perpetrators choose individual victims. An
"opportunistic" decision to target a gay man in such a case is thus
connected to the bias of others in the larger society and to the history of
oppression of the group. Reliance on the prototype, however, tends to miss
the social dimension of anti-gay bias, leading to an interpretation of an
event as either based on personal hate or on a "neutral" cost-benefit
190. Lu-in Wang, supra note 121, at 896.
191. IRIS MNAION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLTCS OF DIFFERENcE 62 (1990).
192. See Joseph Harry, Derivative Deviance: The Cases of Ertortion. Fag-Bashing. and
Shakedown of Gay Men, 19 CRIINOLOGY 546,548-51 (1982).
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analysis. What is missing from such an account is an understanding of the
psychology of "hate" as a complex phenomenon that is socially reinforced,
even in a society that professes to condemn it.
Finally, the prototype of the hate crime reinforces dichotomous
thinking, often to the detriment of the groups that are supposed to be
protected by the special laws. Because the prototype carries with it an
implicit causal story, linked to the character or disposition of the
perpetrator, it makes us less likely to search for other plausible causes for
the behavior, in the long run contributing to the sense that differing causes
(e.g., animus and opportunism) must also be mutually exclusive. As the
social science research on gay-bashing demonstrates, the closer we look at
the motivation behind human behavior, the more likely we are to find
multiple causes. Because social events are often overdetermined and the
motivation behind any individual action is largely unknowable, the
attribution of causes is a social judgment over which there is likely to be
considerable disagreement. In many cases, ascribing an event to "mixed
motivations" not only seems sensible, but represents a kind of compromise
between contending political forces. For this reason, I suspect that, under
scrutiny, many cases will turn out be cases of mixed motivation. It thus
becomes crucial how such cases are categorized. Prototypical reasoning
pushes in the direction of excluding cases of mixed motivation from the
central category, as is evidenced by the practice of law enforcement to
consider as bias crimes only those acts motivated exclusively by personal
animus or hate. Even when the applicable legislation is silent on how to
treat cases of mixed motivation, reliance on the prototype may have the
effect of narrowing the category to include only "sole cause" situations.
In addition to ruling out cases of mixed motivation from the central
legal category, reliance on the prototype encourages the conceptualization
of dual or multiple causes as discrete social forces, missing the mutually
reinforcing character of "different" motivations. Thus, psychological
research indicates that teenage boys sometimes engage in gay-bashing to
seek thrills, recognition from peers, social bonding, or even as a diversion
from boredom. 193 In one respect, these motivations appear functional or
rational and removed from acts driven by pure or irrational hate, because
the perpetrator derives an external benefit from his act and likely would not
193. See Karen Franklin, Unassuming Motivations: Contextualizing the Narratives of Antigav
Assailants, in STIGMA AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION: UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AGAINST LESBIANS,
GAY MEN, AND BISEXUALS 1 (Gregory M. Herek ed., 1998); Karen Franklin, Psychosocial Motivations
of Hate Crime Perpetrators: Implications for Educational Interventions, Presentation to the American
Psychological Association Annual Convention (Aug. 16, 1998).
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commit the act without his peers also being present. In another sense,
however, the motivations are not distinct from hate or animus. Precisely
because it is the low social regard in which gay men are held in society that
makes it permissible for the group to be targeted, the victimization itself
may give rise to or reinforce a feeling of repulsion or aversion in the
perpetrators. Resorting to the prototype may make it more difficult to see
behind the hate to the social forces that help construct individual
motivation. Like the fundamental attribution error and the exclusion of
mixed-motivation cases, the tendency to view causes as discrete, rather
than interactive, contributes to the dominant view of hate crimes as
personal acts of brutality unrelated to dominant ideologies and
discriminatory patterns of behavior that do not qualify as crimes.
IV. CONCLUSION: COMPARING AND CONTRASTING
DEVALUATION AND BIASED PROTOTYPES
My analysis of devaluation and biased prototypes suggests an
important link between the two recurring types of contemporary bias. It is
significant that each is cognitive in nature, affecting the way we
conceptualize and value human behavior and human activities. With
respect to devaluation, the cognitive association of the activity with a
particular gender or racial group-the gendering or racing of the
category-influences how the activity is valued and where it is placed on a
hierarchy of value. Thus, predominantly female jobs are marginalized and
become less important to the economic welfare of the family and the larger
economy because of their association with women. The disparity in
imposition of the death sentence sends the message that the taking of a
black life is a less serious offense than the taking of white life, that it is
somehow less disruptive of the social order.
Similarly, the cognitive bias underlying reliance on narrow prototypes
projects important statements about relative value. By drawing a line
between normalcy and deviancy, the prototypes distinguish between real
crimes (i.e., truly serious behavior) and normal (if undesirable) conduct,
suggesting that the law ought only to address the former. Thus, the
stranger-rape prototype makes it more likely that the harm of date or
acquaintance rape will be minimized and characterized as consensual sex.
The emergence of the narrow "hate crime" prototype means that
opportunistic criminal behavior intentionally targeting a minority business
may not warrant an enhanced sentence, even though the victims perceive
that their ethnicity has made them vulnerable to exploitation and that their
victimization has had damaging, multiplying effects on others in the social
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group. In the context of welfare, the intensely negative prototype of the
"welfare mother" works to delegitimize families that receive AFDC,
making it seem that this group of mothers has little to offer their children
and that subsidies should be limited to "real" families headed by men who
hold down jobs. Not unlike the devaluation of behavior and activities that
are cognitively associated with women or minorities, biased prototypes
serve to devalue the interests of persons whose experiences do not match
the prototype, making it harder for them to receive the benefits of legal
protection and public subsidy. By subtly signaling who is most deserving
of protection, biased prototypes also create a hierarchy of value, one that is
often hidden from view in the course of criminal prosecutions, police
investigations, and legislative debate.
Interestingly enough, the cognitive moves behind devaluation and
biased prototypes seem to pull in somewhat different directions, at least
from my perspective as a lawyer studying the conceptual structure of
contemporary bias. With respect to devaluation, it is the matching of legal
category to the typical or prototypical category member-the convergence
of the social value of the incumbents with the value assigned to the
activity-that results in the stereotyping of the activity and its depressed
worth. The gendering of the category obscures or overwhelms the other
more "neutral" features of the activity-it is this selective perception that
seems central to the process of devaluation. With respect to biased
prototypes, however, it is the divergence of the prototypical case from the
typical or modal behavior in the class that is most objectionable. When we
are dealing with events that disproportionately affect one gender or
principally target minority racial groups (such as rape or hate crimes), the
danger is not simply that we will devalue the harms because they are
suffered by low-status social groups. Instead, my analysis of biased
prototypes suggests that it is the selecting out of the atypical case for
special attention that works to the detriment of the larger class of victims or
members of the class. The selectivity behind the construction of the biased
prototype indirectly signals that the harms suffered by this much smaller
group are more serious and perhaps qualitatively different from the
negative experiences of the larger group of nonprototypical victims. In this
account, skimpy legal protection is not only inadequate; it exacerbates and
reproduces the low social value of the group it purports to protect.
The most striking contrast between devaluation and biased prototypes,
however, is that the cognitive bias underlying the use of narrow prototypes
does not have a comparative structure. The three features of biased
prototypes described here (their lack of representativeness; the tendency to
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attribute cause to dispositions and character, rather than to situations; and
the reluctance to attribute mixed motivations or reinforcing motivations to
social actors) do not distinguish them from gender-free or race-free
prototypes. In fact, in many instances, biased prototypes tend to downplay
the systemic gender or racial dimensions of the injuries. In contrast to
devaluation, the remedy for biased prototypes thus cannot take the form of
revaluing the harm to make sure it is untainted by the effects of race or
gender. For this type of bias, there is no default standard that tells us what
equality looks like.
Because of its noncomparative structure, it is difficult to envision how
the law might respond to biased prototypes. It is not possible to "ban" the
influence of biased prototypes in the law, particularly because they operate
on the subconscious level and because we all need to simplify the world by
constructing bounded categories, images, and prototypes. 194 Often it seems
that the best we can do is to try to expose the underlying normative
judgments embedded within the biased prototypes to get at precisely what
is objectionable about this kind of cognitive shortcut. When it comes to
discussions of remedy for bias of this sort, scholars often resort to
exhortations that we need to find ways to promote the development of more
diverse images of women's experiences and more resonant stories of the
victimization of racial minorities in the hope of loosening the hold of
narrowing constructions. 195 In this Article, I confess to the same inability
to devise a concrete legal remedy that adequately responds to the harms of
biased prototypes.
What can be said, however, is that some interesting scholarly articles
addressing biased prototypes have focused on changing the law of evidence
as a possible strategy for decreasing the influence of biased prototypes in
the litigation context. 196 In the courtroom, the language of lawyers, judges,
or even witnesses can highlight or "prime" familiar images in the mind of
jurors and increase the chance that jurors will resort to biased prototypes in
deciding whether a crime or injury occurred or whether legal protection is
warranted. To prevent activation of biased prototypes, exclusionary rules
such as rape shield laws are sometimes useful to prevent the jury from
receiving information that might lead them to commit the fundamental
attribution error and to ascribe the cause of the rape to the victim's
194. MARTHA MiNOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND A.mCAN
LAW 54-55 (1990) (discussing the inevitability of categorization).
195. See, e.g., Coombs, supra note 129 (discussing nonlitigation opportunities for challenging the
prototypical sexual assault story).
196. See Taslitz, supra note 125, at 494-96.
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character.'97 There have also been calls for more active intervention on the
part of judges to give cautionary instructions 198 and to stop (or at least
interrupt) lawyers from making subtle or coded appeals to race or
gender,199 interventions that might cut down on the ability of lawyers to
evoke familiar causal scripts.
The remedial suggestions I believe hold the most promise, however,
are not those designed to withhold information and to circumscribe legal
arguments, but those that expand the kind of evidence that is deemed
relevant to the trial of cases. Psychological research by Professor Vicki
Smith using mock jurors indicates that when jurors are explicitly
confronted with their prior preconceptions derived from crime prototypes
and are told how the prototype deviates from the legal definition on a
feature-by-feature basis, they show "remarkable improvement" in being
able to recognize nonprototypical cases as falling within the legal
197. See Orenstein, supra note 130, at 684-86 (Rape shield laws "deprive[] the jury of precisely
the type of information that feeds rape myths and thereby poisons the narrative."). However, one study
indicated that jurors are so strongly inclined to rely on prototypes as an aid to decisionmaking that
simply trying to avoid activating the prototypes or instructing the jurors to disregard the prototype has
little effect on decisionmaking. Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping
Jurors Use the Law, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 507, 532 (1993).
198. See, e.g., Judith Olans Brown, Stephen N. Subrin & Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Some
Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for
Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487, 1508-14 (1997) (proposing cautionary
instruction about stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination). The authors propose that, in employment
discrimination suits alleging race discrimination, the judge alert the jury in the following manner to the
danger of stereotyping and to the social context in which the case is brought:
All of us, no matter how hard we try not to, tend to look at others and weigh what they
have to say through the lens of our own experience and background. We each have a
tendency to stereotype others and to make assumptions about them. Often we see life and
evaluate evidence through a clouded filter that tends to favor those like ourselves, I urge you
to do the best you can to put aside such stereotypes, for all litigants and witnesses are entitled
to a level playing field in which we do the best we can to put aside our stereotypes and
prejudices.
This case, as I have told you, involves Title VII, which is the federal antidiscrimination in
employment statute. Congress determined that discrimination against African Americans and
others was widespread in our country. Unfortunately, such discrimination is by no means a
thing of the past. As you weigh the testimony of witnesses and other evidence, bear in mind
that racial discrimination does in fact exist in our society. Of course, that racial
discrimination exists in the United States by no means suggests that this defendant
discriminated. You must decide the facts about this defendant on the evidence presented in
this case. Evidence does exist, however, in a context; and the context includes the regrettable
tendency of all humans to stereotype to some extent and the unfortunate reality of continued
employment discrimination in our country.
Id. app. at 1531 (footnote omitted).
199. For example, task forces on "bias in the courts" at various state and federal levels have
recommended changes in ethical rules to prohibit lawyers from engaging in certain discriminatory
conduct in the practice of law. See Andrew E. Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still Officers of the
Court: Why the First Amendment Is No Bar to Challenging Racism, Sexism and Ethnic Bias in the
Legal Profession, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 781 (1996).
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definition.20 Thus, perhaps the best antidote to counter the influence of
biased prototypes is the presentation of "social context" evidence from
expert witnesses who can offer data to inform the jury that the prototypical
case is not the typical or average case. Evidence addressing the social
context of battering, for example, has been used productively in some
criminal cases to dispel common images of battered women as crazy or
vindictive and to counter misconceptions that women who fail to leave an
abusive partner must not have suffered a real injury.201  Evidence
establishing that a rape victim has suffered from rape trauma syndrome
provides a reason for a victim's delay in reporting the rape immediately.20 2
Similarly, expert testimony has been admitted in sexual harassment cases to
explain why victims seldom report harassment to their employers and to
describe the various coping mechanisms, short of reporting the incidents,
that women employees use to try to manage the problem.20 3 Particularly
given the propensity to attribute the cause of an event to the character or
disposition of the actor, admission of social context evidence of this sort
might be useful to dislodge the influence of biased prototypes from jurors'
mind and to refocus their attention on the specifics of the case.
Finally, -with respect to remedy, it is important to note that although
devaluation and biased prototypes qualify as forms of "unconscious" bias,
that does not mean that there can be no useful strategies for resisting their
effects. Although the cognitive processes underlying devaluation and
biased prototypes largely operate automatically, there is evidence
indicating that people can control even automatic or unconscious biases if
they are given the right kind of information.204 Under this model, "low
prejudice" persons who desire to act fairly can sometimes check the effects
of unconscious stereotyping and biased prototypes on their decisions once
they are alerted to the potential for bias. Drawing upon this vein of social
cognition theory, Professor Jody Armour has described cognitive bias as a
200. Smith, supra note 197, at 533.
201. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PrT. L REN. 477. 496-97
(1996). In cases involving battered women, however, there also has been a trend toward admission of
psychological evidence of "battered women's syndrome," rather than testimony describing the secial
context of battering. This psychologically oriented evidence tends to focus on the pathology of the
victim and may well reinforce prevailing stereotypes about battered women. Id. at 506.
202. See Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology Credibility. and Rape: The Rape Trauma
Synidrome Issue and Its Iplications for Expert Psychological Testimony. 69 Mt,\,. L REv. 395, 442-
47 (1985); Orenstein, supra note 130, at 702.
203. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486. 1505-07 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (admitting testimony of counselor regarding responses of sexual harassment victims), discussed
in Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Serual and Racial
Harassment Litigation, 1 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 112 (1992).
204. See Fiske, supra note 10, at 392.
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"bad habit. ' 205 Armour explains that, like all bad habits, the habit of
prejudice is hard, but not impossible, to break and doing so requires a
conscious effort.20 6 He argues in favor of bringing hidden biases out into
the open in the course of litigation and permitting lawyers to appeal to the
jury's sense of fairness and commitment to equality.2 7 Armour's "bad
habit" analogy has the great virtue of showing that unconscious biases are
not necessarily impervious to legal reforms, including changes in
evidentiary rules and other measures designed to counter the effects of
biased prototypes.
Despite my attempt to generalize about the features of biased
prototypes, I suspect that the best responses to or remedies for biased
prototypes will be context-specific, designed to counteract the particular
prevailing image that is working to narrow the category in people's minds.
Biased prototypes represent a "second-generation" type of bias: They
typically emerge after there has been an attempt to address harms of a
disfavored social group (e.g., reforming rape law, addressing hate crimes,
extending welfare to minority women) and demonstrate the limitations of
the law in changing pervasive patterns in the larger culture. The contexts I
have investigated in this Article, however, lead me to believe that biased
prototypes are not so submerged as to be invisible or beyond detection and
correction. As with devaluation, however, naming the type of bias is the
easy part. Dislodging cognitive bias calls for noncomparative strategies
that take us quite a long way from the equality-based remedies for
intentional disparate treatment.
205. JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF
BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 133-39 (1997).
206. See id. at 136 ("[N]onprejudiced responses take intention, attention, and effort.") (quoting
Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 16 (1989)). See also Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice:
Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 754-59 (1995), Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L.
REV. 1253, 1286-91 (1998) (arguing that to correct the effects of unconscious bias, persons must be
aware of their mental process, be motivated to control the bias, and understand the magnitude and
direction of the bias) (citing Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental
Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgment and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 119-20
(1994)).
207. ARMOUR, supra note 205, at 147-53 (arguing in favor of permitting references to a party's
(or victim's) race if such reference has the effect of enhancing the rationality of the process and alerting
decisionmakers to their own unconscious biases).
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